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1. Introduction 
The media hype about China’s engagements across the African continent has caused a lot of 
contention. The Western media has been particularly negative towards China’s activities in Africa, 
using headline grabbing scare-mongering quotes from various politicians such as “Cameron warns 
Africa of the ‘Chinese invasion’ as they pour billions into the continent” (Groves, 2011) and “Hillary 
Clinton warns Africa of ‘New Colonialism’” (Lee, 2011).  There are numerous queries raised, 
especially about  the Chinese aid programme. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
are constantly trying to put numbers and hard facts to how much of what China is doing in Africa is 
aid, trade or investment but with very little success according to Brautigam and Pengtao Li 
(Brautigam, 2009) (Pengtao, 2010). This is, on the one hand, due to a lack of transparency on the 
part of the Chinese regarding what they are doing. This lack of transparency makes it is difficult, 
especially for an third party, to understand how China operates when it comes to aid, trade and 
investments. On the other hand, one of the reasons the West has difficulties in identifying what 
China is doing is because it is different from how the West operates. Chinese aid for example 
cannot be understood by the Western definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
because it is simply different.    
Apart from transparency issues, Western media and politicians have also strongly critisized China 
for its “no-strings attached” policy. As good governance has been one of the main focuses and 
criteria for receiving Western aid, the West believes that the “no-strings attached” non- 
interferance foreign policy that China has is going to increase corruption and possibly destroy the 
democratisation process that the Western world is promoting in Africa. There has also been huge 
critism regarding China’s environmental policy and human right issues in its dealings with Africa. 
However, China has not buckled to any of the media attention from the West and still continues to 
increase its alliances with many African countries, such as Zambia, which is the focal case study in 
this paper. 
There is no clear concensus on China’s involvement in the African continent. In Zambia,  Chinese 
presence continues to fuel heated debate from the highest political level to local traders. On one 
hand, references are made to the “no-strings attached” nature of Chinese investments in contrast 
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to the IMF having forced Zambia to privatise its mining sector in 1995. Some also refer to the quick 
response of Chinese money to provide funding for projects that meet the needs of everyday 
Zambians. At the other end of the spectrum, others refer to Chinese companies’ lack of 
compliance to Zambian law and the unfair competition that Chinese investments have brought to 
the Zambian economy. 
With all this in mind, we want to want to provide a different approach which shifts the focus from 
China and the West to a more African (Zambian) perspective on the discourse regarding China in 
Africa. Instead of focusing on China, we want to sugguest that if any “investments” are going to 
benefit the Zambian economy, then it is very much dependent on  what the Zambian government 
does in terms of policy and strategy, rather than who its partner is. 
2. Research area  
China has increasingly moved into the Africa continent, especially since 1995 where the “going 
abroad” strategy was launched. From this point resources became increasingly important in 
China’s engagement with Africa (Brautigam, 2008). Zambia has had increased investments from 
China (Kragelund, 2009) and with the building of the Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone 
(MFEZ) by the Chinese company China Non-Ferrous Metal Company Limited (CNMC),  this has 
become more apparent. This investment was made within the framework of the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) where, as quoted by the ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry 
(MCTI, 2013). 
the Chinese President, His Excellency, Mr. Hu Jintao committed to develop five (5) trade 
and economic zones in Africa from the period 2007 to 2009. Zambia was selected as the 
first African country to benefit from this commitment(MCTI, 2013). 
However, the Chinese partnership with Zambia has not gone without critique. In 2006 the leader 
of the patriotic front, Micheal Sata, called the Chinese investors “infestors”, and attacked Chinese 
investment in the 2006 election campaign (Brautigam, 2011). Micheal Sata lost the election but 
highlighted perceived problems regarding Chinese investments in Zambia. In 2011 Micheal Sata 
won the Zambian election, and with this a new “policy” can be seen to have been embarked on, 
one which has a focus on improving the gains that Zambia receives from FDI.     
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It is clear that Chinese investments in the mining industry are of high importance to the 
development of the country. Much of the Zambian economy relies on extraction of natural 
resources. Directly, mining contributes to about 11 percent of GDP but the indirect contribution 
might be as much as half the economy (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2013). Copper 
accounted for 5.8 billion USD in 2010 which is 78 percent of the Zambian economy. The Chambishi 
MFEZ is located in the Zambian copperbelt, which has some of the largest copper and cobalt 
deposits in the world (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2013), and where it is aimed at 
creating the platform for Zambia to “achieve economic development by attracting significant 
domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) through a strengthened policy and legislative 
environment” (MCTI, 2013). 
 
With the change in government and the vital importance of the copper industry for the Zambian 
economy, our research question is as follows: 
3. Research question  
 
Zambia's partnership with China: Making the most of China’s investments in the copper 
industry. How can we understand the shift in strategy under President Sata in the context of 
Chinese investments in the copper industry, using the Chambishi Multi Facility Economic zone 
and Chambishi Copper Smelter as examples? 
4. Limitations 
It has been impossible to contact the Chambishi CCS and obtain up-to-date data related to CCS and 
Chinese investments. There is clearly a lack of transparency in this field and an overall lack of 
willingness to communicate; it has also been difficult to get in contact with Zambian government 
officials with telephone calls being passed around to different departments and personnel without 
many results. This lack of contact-possibilities has hindered our work in regards to collecting first-
hand data.   
 
In the project we have excluded to look at; The intra-African trade, which could have impact on 
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Zambia, if China is using Zambia and other African countries as a form of hub to get ”free trade” on 
the continent. 
 
We have not investigated what impact local Chinese traders have on local Zambian entrepreneurs. 
In theory it could have spill-over effects, but there have also been talk of Chinese traders 
outcompeting local Zambian entrepreneurs, which could have negative effect on Zambian 
economy. 
 
We have not investigated to what degree Zambia has other possibilities, for example, with regards 
to exporting copper to other countries. This could be interesting to see in what degree Zambia has 
possibilities to bargain with China (power relations) 
 
We might have further investigated capital-flow, from the enterprises to see if there is some sort of 
tax-evasion from the companies which are transnational. 
5. Methodology 
5.1 Research approach 
This paper  is an empirical study of Chinese investments in  the copper industry in Zambia – 
through the Chambishi MFEZ. This approach was chosen because after much review of the 
different theories covering investment, it was clear that none of these fits into the Chinese-African 
context.  This is by no means insinuating that the classic economic theories could not be adapted 
into the Zambia-China context. However, as Brautigam expressed in her book in 2009, trying to 
compare Chinese investments/aid to western  investment/aid is like trying to compare apples and 
oranges. In the same way, we felt that, it would be biased to analyse Chinese investments with 
Western theories as the Chinese model/approach is simply very different.  
The decision to conduct an imperical study was also made on the grounds of giving the two parties 
(Zambia and China) involved (in particular Zambia) the focus of the analysis. As expressed in the 
introduction, this paper wants to look at what the Zambian government is doing and needs to do 
in order to optimize Chinese investment in the copper industry using the Chambishi Multi-Facility 
Economic Zone (MFEZ) and Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS) as a case study. Of particular interest 
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are some of the issues highlighted as being areas where Zambia has or is not benefitting as much 
as it could from investments. Both in terms of revenue but also in terms of working conditions for 
Zambians and environmental effects. The ability of the Chambishi MFEZ to operate as a platform 
for further economic development in the country is also of interest.   
We consider the need for an active role as opposed to a laissez-faire approach by the Zambian 
government to be of utmost importance if investment in Zambia is to provide the country with its 
fair share of the benefits.  
Why Zambia 
The reason Zambia was chosen as a focus of this report is because Zambia has had long historic 
ties with China which gives scope for deeper discussion on Chinese investments in Africa. Since 
Zambia’s privatisation of its mining sector and the implementation of China “going-out” strategy, 
there has been a radical increase in Chinese activities in Zambia, especially in the copper industry. 
Figure 1 below gives an overview of Chinese investment offers across the African continent. Even 
though this diagram does not necessarily say anything about the number of Chinese companies 
that are currently operating in Africa, it does show that Zambia seems to be an area of very high 
interest for Chinese investers. Furthermore, as Kragelund observes, copper is a big part of this 
interest (Kragelund, 2009). 
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Figure 1.  
 
Source: (Badkar, 2012)  
Why the Zambian copper industry 
The Zambian copper industry was chosen as a focal point because of its relevance to both the 
Zambian economy as well as to the Chinese. As mentioned before, copper is of huge interest for 
Chinese investors: According to Pengtao (2010) in 2009, investments in mining constituted over 
88% of total investments in Zambia (Pengtao, 2010). Secondly, copper is a very important resource 
for Zambia: in 2008, copper exports peaked at about US$4 billion before decreasing to US$3.7 
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billion in 2009 (Fessehaie, 2011). Since 2006, copper has accounted for 73.5% - 83.2% of total 
foreign exchange earnings. In 2009 copper also provided  10% of all formal employment in Zambia 
and copper production accounted for 9.1% of GDP (Fessehaie, 2011). The goes to show that the 
Zambian copper industry is a very relevant part of its economy. This combination of factors show 
the need for a significant analysis of Zambia’s economy in relation to Chinese investments to have 
a focus on the copper industry. 
Why the Chambishi MFEZ and Chambishi Copper smelter 
This economic zone is very relevant for Zambia’s economy as well as Chinese investments because 
it was the first attempt by the Chinese to use this type of zone as platform for the “going global” 
strategy in Africa. Another important reason why this zone is important for Zambia’s copper 
industry is because of its ambition to implement a “value adding” and diversification strategy with 
the establishment of the Chambishi Copper Smelter in 2009 and later other manufacturing 
industries. We believe that it is important for Zambia’s economic growth to take its copper 
industry from extraction to another level i.e. manufacturing. 
The Chambishi Copper Smelter 
To link the analysis to what is actually happening on the ground, we have decided to take a step 
further and also look at the Chambishi  Copper Smelter (CCS). As mentioned before, this enterprise 
is specially interesting due to its role in adding value to the copper that is mined in Zambia. It is 
also an interesting case because it has had a turbulent history in terms of Zambian-Chinese 
relations and can be seen to highlight areas where there has been a need for policy change.   
5.2 Data and critique of sources 
In this project we have tried to avoid western sources due to their potential tendency to view the 
situation of Chinese expansion in Africa from a Western perspective and bias. Therefore we have 
sought to use sources primarily from Zambia and China. The western sources we have used, do we 
have a critical stance too.  
 
Zambia Development Agency: According to the ZDA website, the “The ZDA is responsible for 
fostering economic growth and development in Zambia through promoting trade and investment 
and an efficient, effective and coordinated private sector led economic development 
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strategy.”(zda.org, n.d.) 
That this agency has private led economic development strategy as its goal is something one 
should be aware of. 
 
African Development Bank; This organisation is affiliated with the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) which means that this also has linkages 
to western economics. 
 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was conducted by the UK, and also has some 
linkages to the World Bank (EITI, 2013).  
 
World Bank; we are aware of the bias of the World Bank in supporting western interests. 
 
Human Rights Watch (HRW); is an independent organisation which has as its focus to “lay the legal 
and moral groundwork for deep-rooted change and has fought to bring greater justice and security 
to people around the world.” (HRW.org, n.d.) 
6. Zambia as a country  
6.1 Politics  
Zambia became a republic on the 24th of October 1964 under Dr. Kenneth Kaunda. Between 1972 
and 1990, Zambia was under one party rule with the United National Independence Party UNIP in 
power with Kenneth Kaunda as President. Democratic elections were held in 1991 when the UNIP 
was replaced by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) who managed to hold power for 
the next 20 years (despite allogations of election fraud in 2002 and 2008). The Patriotic Front (PF) 
won the 2011 elections and is the current ruling party, under the presidency of Michael Sata (BBC 
News Africa, 2012). At present there are a number of opposition parties in Zambia, including: the 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) the United Party for National Development (UPND); 
Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD); United National Independence Party (UNIP); 
Heritage Party (HP); and the Zambia Republican Party (ZRP) (Bank of Zambia, n.d.) 
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6.2 Economy 
In 2012, Manufacturing contributed 12.2 percent to the Zambian economy (Zambia Development 
Agency, 2013). According to the African Development Bank (AFDB), Zambia’s prospects for 
sustained growth depend on increased economic diversification, away from mining. The 
manufacturing sector is especially important to the country's long term growth and employment 
strategy. In 2011, manufacturing growth was 5%, in line with industry estimates, but the sector 
accounted for only 9.1% of the economy, down from 11.2% in 2006. According to AFDB, growth 
was primarily driven by increased investment, particularly in agroprocessing (African Development 
Outlook, 2012). The bank also writes that the growth in manufacturing and other sectors depends 
on improved access to affordable finance and continued implementation of structural reforms to 
spur private sector participation. High interest rates are seen as a barrier to accessing credit, 
especially for small businesses. In a bid to reduce lending rates the government cut the corporate 
tax rate in the banking sector from 40% to 35% (African Development Outlook, 2012: 5). The public 
deficit of Zambia has fallen to 3.6% percent in 2012 and is expected to fall to 3% in 2013 (African 
Development Outlook, 2012), The public deficit, according to AFDB, reflects the new government’s 
policy of increased expenditure on social and infrastructural development. Domestic revenues are 
expected to fall to 13.6 percent of GDP in 2012, largely because of tax relief granted to low income 
earners. To partly cushion the impact of this measure, the Sata-government has raised the 
minerals royalty rate from 3% to 6%. The AFDB concludes that the main challenge for fiscal policy 
remains that of widening the tax base, increasing the tax take from the mining sector, and 
allocating these resources to productive uses. (African Development Outlook, 2012: 6) It is further 
noted that the dominance of the extractive sector in Zambia exports is a major source of 
vulnerability and efforts to diversify away from its traditional reliance on copper should be 
accelerated (African Development Outlook, 2012: 7) Manufacturing is seen, in a World Bank 
report, as a way to get away from this kind of reliance. Furthermore, manufacturing can contribute 
to copper production, because manufacturers may use copper input in their production (The 
World Bank Zambia, 2011). Zambian infrastructure is seen, by the World Bank, as an issue facing 
the development of manufacturing in the country. Over time the infrastructure in the country has 
decayed. This is a problem because Zambia is a landlocked country with a high dependence on 
export commodities. Energy costs are low, but power quality and reliability are of critical 
importance. We can note here that China has been building infrastructure in Zambia and that 
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Chinese enterprises now account for 60% of Zambia’s infrastructure market, 50% of its 
construction market, 20% of mining projects and 10% of the agriculture and service market, 
creating about 20 000 jobs in Zambia (Mutumweno, 2011).   
 
Further information on Zambia’s macroeconomy can be found in Appendix i. 
 
6.3 Imports and Exports in Zambia 
The United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Department (UN-Comtrade) states that in 2010, 
exports of manufactured goods was the largest commodity for export and represented 80 percent 
of exported goods. These goods have had an average growth rate of 19.4% from 2006-2010, and a 
growth of 87.5% from 2009-2010 (UN-Comtrade, 2011) 
Switzerland was, in 2010, the top partner for exports with a share of 51% of total exports. The 
report states that in the last three years, copper products were the top commodities for export, 
with refined copper and copper alloys accounting for 76.4% of exports (UN-Comtrade, 2011). 
According to the Zambian Development Agency (ZDA), Zambia has preferential market access to a 
number of key markets. Zambia is a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), which makes it part of a customs union and is a member of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) which is a free trade area. This makes a total of 25 different 
countries in Africa where free trade or at least a higher degree of free trade is possible (UNCTAD, 
2011). However, the balance of trade in relations to the African countries was negative in 2010, 
with a trade deficit of about two billion USD (UN-Comtrade, 2011). 
Zambia also has market access to the European Union (EU) under the Everything But Arms (EBA) 
initiative, in which all imports to the European union from least developed countries such as 
Zambia are duty and quota free (UNCTAD, 2011) 
 
From 1998 to 2006 Zambia had a favourable trade balance with China. Most of China’s exports to 
Zambia are machinery, chemicals, medicines and electronic goods, whereas Chinese imports from 
Zambia are mostly copper and cotton. However, the influx of cheap products such as textiles and 
apparels from China and Asia in general is said to be one of the factors behind the demise of 
Zambia's textiles and apparels sectors (Baah and Jauch, 2009). 
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6.4  Employment 
One of President Sata’s election promises was that he: “…will create more jobs, reduce taxes and 
put more money in people's pockets.” (Yang, 2013). As stated earlier (section 6.2) there has 
already been a tax break implemented for people with a low income. The Zambian economy has 
had a growth rate of 6.6% between 2008 and 2012 (World Bank, 2013). However, Zambia has not 
been able to convert this growth into well being and is considered by some to be the worst 
performer in all of Africa: 
Zambia is another of Africa’s fast growers but it is the worst performer by a distance at 
turning that GDP growth into greater well-being. It has improved only half as much as it 
should have, given the growth in GDP per head (The Economist, 2013). 
Problems of unemployment especially effect the youth, and also pose challenges to Zambia’s long 
term growth. About 300,000 young people enter the labour market each year and a lack of 
employment opportunities for the large number of unemployed youth is creating political and 
economic tension in the country. The new PF Government has made it a priority to implement 
projects and programs stressing creation of youth employment through entrepreneurship. To 
address the issue of technical skills, the government reorganized the Zambia National Service into 
the Zambian Youth Training Service with a mandate to strengthen youth skills training. In the 2012 
budget, the government increased funding for education and skills development by 26.7%. The 
government has also tried to tailor the educational system towards an entrepreneurial system with 
more tertiary institutions, education loans and youth scholarships (African Development Outlook, 
2012). In the copperbelt there is currently an unemployment percentage of 32% (African 
Development Bank Group, 2013). 
6.4 Mineral wealth  
Copper, cobalt, zinc, lead, coal, emeralds, gold, silver, uranium, hydropower are some of Zambia’s 
main resources. However, copper is its main export commodity. The country holds the largest 
reserves of copper in Africa, holding 6 percent of the global copper reserve and in 2011 was the 7th 
largest producer of copper in the world (Fessehaie, 2011) (The World Bank Zambia, 2011).  
7. Relationship and interaction between Africa and China 
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7.1 Historical overview  
After World War II, China’s civil war resumed until Mao Zedong and the communist army pushed 
the government of the Republic of China into retreat on the island of Taiwan in 1949 and the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was formed (Brautigam, 2009). With the combination of factors 
such as China’s support for North Korea in 1950 and support for Taiwan by the United States of 
America (USA), an economic embargo was placed on the PRC by the US which lasted for over two 
centuries. During this period of isolation, the PRC began to secure diplomatic allies by supporting 
socialist countries and Marxist independence movements1 by transferring food, medicine, clothing 
and other industrial products to these countries (ibid. p. 29).  
Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference 
In the light of securing allies, the PRC’s first premier Zhou Enlai together with the heads of states 
of Indonesia, India, Egypt, and several sub-saharan African leaders met for the first Afro-Asian 
People’s solidarity conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. During this conference, the Afro-
Asian solidarity adopted the five principles of peaceful coexistence2 as their foundation 
(Brautigam, 2009). These principles were3:  
1. Mutual respect for soverign and territorial integrity 
2. Mutual non-aggression  
3. Non-interferance in each other’s internal affairs 
4. Equalilty and mutual benefit 
5. Peaceful coexistence 
These five principles were later extended to eight principles and as Brautigam observes, these 
principles still reflect how China operates in Africa today (ibid p. 29-30). These eight principles will 
be discussed to later on in this section. 
African independence 
A few years after the Afro-Asian conference, a wave of independence began to spread across the 
African continent and many colonial states in Africa gained independence. During this period, the 
                                                          
1
 PRC also provided support in form of aid to Nepal even though it was a non-socialist country. 
2
 These principles were first used in negotiations with India over Tribet in 1954 
3
 Today, the 5 principles are now 8 principles which are still very much the core values of Chinese strategic alliences. 
13 
 
PRC sent funds and supplies as well as advisors to several independence movements, as well as to 
some of the nations that were facing great opposition from their colonial masters e.g Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) (Brautigam, 2009).  However, China’s engagements in Africa were 
still very diplomatic and superficial in nature until in 1955 where a trade delegation from Egypt led 
by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, Mohammed Abu Nosseir, visited China and signed a 
three year Trade Agreement (Fernando, 2007). Shortly after, the PRC extended an aid –project to 
Guinea (Brautigam, 2009). Diplomatic ties with Guinea were established in 1959 and in 1960 China 
advanced an interest free loan to Guinea for the construction of a cigarette and match factory in 
the country (Ibid, p. 31).  
Political alliances 
Meanwhile, around this time (1960) the Soviet Union stopped its aid to China due to differences in 
communist ideologies. The Soviet Union also stopped all technical assistance to China (Brautigam, 
2008). Furthermore, Taiwan was still occupying its seat at the United Nations (UN). With the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union and the support for Taiwan from the USA, as well as the economic 
embargo on the PRC, China worked hard to gain power on the international stage by establishing 
diplomatic ties with the newly independent African countries. Iin 1971, the PRC gained its UN seat 
with the support of its allies, most of which were the newly independent African countries 
(Brautigam, 2008) 
The eight principles of foreign aid and the expansion of China’s activities in Africa 
In 1964, the Eight Principles of foreign aid were established. These eight principles of foreign aid 
were drawn from the five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that the Afro-Asian solidarity adopted 
back in 1955 in Indonesia. Not only did these new principles begin a new era in the China-Africa 
relations then but they also still guide China’s foreign aid today. 
The Eight Principles of foreign aid: 
1. Emphasize equality and mutual benefit 
2. Respect sovereignty and never attach conditions 
3. Provide interest-free or low-interest loans 
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4. Help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance 
5. Build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly 
6. Provide quality equipment and material at market prices 
7. Ensure effective technical assistance 
8. Pay experts according to local standards 
(Chin and Frolic, 2007) (State Council of the PRC, 2011)  
After the establishement of the eight priciples of foreign aid, China’s aid programme expanded 
rapidly to many other African countries; Tunisia, Congo, Zambia, Tanzania and Ghana in 1964; 
Mauritania, Uganda in 1965; Equatorial Guinea and Ethiopia in 1970; Nigeria, Rwanda, Cameroon, 
Sierra Leone and Burundi in 1971; Mauritius, Togo, Madagascar, and Benin in 1973; Gabon in 
1974; Botswana, Mozambique, Comoros in 1975; Cape Verde, and Seychelles in 1976. By the late 
1970s, China provided aid to forty-three African countries (Fernando, 2007)These aid programmes 
were established in the form of interest free loans, grants combined with loans, and also the 
construction of a number of infrastructure projects.  A well known example is the interest free 
loan offered to Zambia and Tanzania in 1967 for the construction of the Tan-Zam Railway (1967-
1976) (Brautigam, 2009). During this period, these aid programmes resulted in the establishment 
of several African state-owned factories across the continent. The Chinese also provided these 
African countries with technical support both in terms of know-how as well as skilled technicians, 
to work with and train Africans to built bridges, hospitals, schools and roads (Brautigam, 2008). 
With the support of other developing countries, China solidified its international position by taking 
back the UN seat that had been occupied by Taiwan until 1971 . 
“Open door” policy 
After Mao’s death in 1976, the country  reformed towards a more socialist market economy which 
started in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s “open-door” policy. The aim of the reform was to increase 
the role of market mechanisms in the system by reducing government planning and direct control 
(Hu, 2005). Subsequently China joined the IMF and the World Bank and became an increasingly 
attractive country to invest in. Several Western countries, as well as Japan, provided bilateral aid 
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to China as well as investment in China. During the early 1980s modernisation and internal 
development became priorities. During this period, China’s aid to Africa started being less political 
altruism to being more commercially oriented. In the latter part of the 1980s, China’s leaders 
announced that they would undertake new aid projects on the scale of the Tan-Zam Railway 
through the promotion of joint prosperity which at this stage was highlighted as a major foreign 
policy objective. In addition, China also announced in 1987 that 69%  of China’s aid funds must be 
spent on Chinese equipment (Brautigam, 2008) thereby tying the aid, and securing an economic 
benefit for China. The post-Mao reforms indeed accelerated changes during the 1980s and 1990s 
and a variety of new forms of aid were incorporated with joint ventures, assisted sustainability 
and aid-to-profit (ibid., p. 204).  
By this time, China was clearly on a slow, but steady rise and its relations with the West were 
much better than before. Between 1979 and 1982, China’s aid programme slowed down 
temporarily as Chinese leaders were getting use to the more market-oriented “open-door” 
international economic policy (Brautigam, 2008). China’s commitment fell from $254 million in 
1980 to just $25 million in 1981, before climbing back up to $289 million in 1984 out of which 
$258.9 million went to Africa, making China the sixth largest donor in Africa that year (ibid., p. 
203-204).  
To promote South-South cooperation with an emphasis on the principals of equality and mutual 
benefit, practical results, diversity, and common progress, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang visited 
eleven African countries at the end of 1982. The event was regarded as an important move for 
China-Africa relations. After this time, China’s engagements in African were more economic in 
nature. This corresponded very well with China’s plan to switch the emphasis away from aid and 
towards a variety of other forms of engagement that would benefit both partners. In other words, 
China had learned from opening-up its market to economic ecooperation with Japan and the West 
and these experiences had an impact on the reshaping of the foreign aid system, which meant a 
decreasing of direct aid and an increase of combined aid with trade and investment (Ibid,.2008, p. 
205).   
“Going Abroad” strategy 
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In 1995, China launched another reform. From 1995 onwards, trade and access to mineral 
resources became progressively important in China’s engagement with Africa, however resources 
are not the only purposes of Chinese engagement as Brautigam observes, “the Chinese are 
interested in everything” (Brautigam, 2008). Since the foreign policy reform in 1995, Chinese 
leaders began to emphasize the significance of China’s ties to Africa. From 1991 onwards, it 
became a tradition for China’s Foreign Minister to visit a group of African countries in January each 
year (ibid., p. 207). 
China’s engagement with Africa during the late 90s till present has been a “well-thought-out and 
long-term strategy” (Brautigam, 2009). More specifically, the strategy came about in three 
important steps: First, in 1995 a major aid reform was established in order to link aid, trade and 
investments. Second, after 2000, Chinese leaders took their role as promoters of “common 
prosperity” very importantly and created several regional organisations that supported programs 
which combined aid and economic cooperation.  
Third, China joined the WTO in 2001, and in addition to that, China introduced the “going out  
strategy” as a tool to help its domestic restructuring by pushing its mature industries overseas to 
invest. This is seen as complementing the already in-place “open door” strategy (as discussed 
earlier in this section) (Power, 2012). As a continuation of this step, it was decided to establish fifty 
economic cooperation zones in other countries (Brautigam, 2009).  As a part of the reform, China’s 
Eximbank started to offer concessional loans, which were seen as the centrepiece of the foreign 
policy reform. As a component of the “going out” strategy, the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
began to help and encourage firms to go out. As part of this strategy, the MOFCOM and the MFA 
in 2004 also provided a handbook (a guidance catelogue) on which countries and industries were 
viewed to be relevant investment areas for the Chinese economy with resources being a big 
targeted area (Ibid., 2012, p. 101). By 2002,  the Chinese government had selected 50 of its 
globally competive companies and ecourage them to invest overseas. As incentives, these 
companies enjoyed a range of benefits: information sharing; domestic tax breaks; cheap land and 
low interest loans (Ibid., 2012, 103-105). As Africa was one of the areas seen as a relevant are for 
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investment, firms operating in Africa also received export credits for feasibility studies, guaranteed 
bank loans and financing for their operational cost (Ibid., 2012, p. 104) 
 In regards to Africa, the strategy called the “Great Economic and Trade Strategy” was launched 
with the purpose of combining aid to Africa, as well as mutual cooperation and trade together 
(Brautigam, 2009). As mentioned before, 50 special economic zones were established, these 
special economic zones are similar to China’s own economic zones which were used by the 
Japanese as a platform to spearhead development and mutual benefit alliances between the two 
countries (Ibid., 2009 p. 97).  From this we can say that,  China is using its own experience as a 
framework when dealing with Africa and that is very reflective on how China has transformed 
from providing development aid projects to re-focusing on the principle of “mutual benefit” in 
more economic terms and how that is very much reflected in the “going out” strategy. 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
China further expanded its economic and political engagement with African countries with the 
initiation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000. which is a platform for 
building a long-term “win-win” China-Africa relations (FOCAC.org, 2013). FOCAC is a forum 
consisting of China and fifty African countries aimed at making collective decision making process, 
dialogue and a cooperation between the developing countries, which fall under the classification 
of South-South cooperation. Since the establishment of FOCAC five ministerial summits have been 
held every third year; 2000, Beijing (China); 2003, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia); 2006, Beijing(China); 
2009, Sharm el-Sheikh (Egypt); and 2012, Beijing (China). 
Of these five summits, 2006 was the largest and most significant one: for three days, China hosted 
forty-eight African nations in Beijing. Earlier that same year, China’s foreign policy towards Africa 
was published. The paper describes the progress in China’s relations with Africa, and addresses the 
Chinese government’s long-term strategy for its engagement with the African continent,  which 
later became some of the agenda that was presented in that year’s summit (Power, 2012). The 
document also includes a brief on Africa’s history; China’s relations with Africa; and China’s African 
policy; as well as a section on enhancing all-round cooperation between China and Africa (i.e. the 
different fields of cooperation between the two parties specifically in politics, economics, 
education, science, culture, health, social aspects as well as peace and security.) As noted by 
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Brautigam (The Real Story of China in Africa, 2010) this indicates clearly that Chinese interests are 
not focused on natural resources alone. Since then the subsequent FOCAC summits have also 
been on how to strengthen Sino-African relations. Grants and pledges are promised and China 
seems to increase its commitment to Africa at each summit. The latest FOCAC summit was held in 
Beijing again and below is the agenda (China-Africa Blog, 2012): 
1. expand cooperation in investment and financing to support sustainable development in 
Africa; 
2. continue to increase assistance to Africa to bring the benefits of development to the 
African people; 
3. support the African integration process through a partnership on transnational and trans-
regional infrastructure development and trade; 
4. carry out “China-Africa people-to-people friendship action” to support and promote 
exchanges and cooperation between people’s organizations, women, youth, academia and 
the media of the two sides; 
5. promote peace and stability in Africa by launching the “Initiative on China-Africa 
Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security”, deepening cooperation with the AU and 
African countries in peace and security in Africa, provide financial support and training for 
AU peace-keeping missions. 
As something new for the FOCAC meeting, in 2012 both China and the Africa addressed the need 
to strengthen the summit’s focus on the increasing threats that bring about climate change and 
environmental degredation. China’s President Hu Jintao also addressed the need to move towards 
more sustainable development and called on African leaders to cordinate with each other to come 
up with better strategies and support a more friendly environmental path going beyond the local 
level to the international level between the African states (China-Africa Blog, 2012). Until this time, 
the agendas for the FOCAC meeting were more on economic benefits and improving strategic 
alliances. However, the 2012 summit gives the impression that China is indeed putting in efforts to 
improve its partnership with African nations not only in terms of economic benefits but also in 
terms of the physical long-term sustainability. Also new to FOCAC’s agenda was the promotion of 
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people-people co-operation as part of the Beijing action plan to promote entrepreneural activity 
between the Chinese and African people.  
How China operates in Africa today 
Today China puts emphasis on providing aid to build infrastructure most often combined with 
other kinds of alliances like sending medical teams, engineers, providing scholarship programs, 
humanitarian aid, youth volunteers, budget support, aid-in-kind, and technical assistance, trade, 
investment (Brautigam, 2009).  
The following eight points are based on the eight principles of Chinese foreign aid as presented by 
Chin and Frolic, 2007; State Council of the PRC, 2011 and Brautigam, 2009 
1. Emphasize equality and mutual benefit: The Chinese have in the past stressed,  and continue to 
stress, that their cooperation with African countries is based on the ability for both parties to 
benefit. This point stirs up further questions for possible further studies regarding Chinese 
investments such as: whether the Chinese only cooperate with countries who have something to 
“offer”?  
2. Respect sovereignty and never attach conditions: This point is on one hand reflected in the one 
China rule, which is also the only condition that China requires from the African nations that it 
works with. On the other hand, China has a “no strings attached” policy when it engages in Africa, 
i.e., China tries to remain invisible in the political affairs of African countries.  
3. Provide interest-free or low-interest loans: The provision of interest free or low interest loans 
has been on the increase in China’s engagements with Africa. However, there are pre-made 
agreements on the percentage of the loans that should be spent on Chinese goods and services. 
4. Help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance: Sourcing from China’s own 
experience on how it promoted local development, the Chinese believe that African countries 
need to become more independent by taking the driver’s seat regarding their development  
5. Build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly : The Chinese are 
interested in seeing results and quickly. As mentioned before, the loans granted by the Chinese 
are tied with conditions of how much of the loans are to be spent on Chinese products, thereby 
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bringing back benefits to China. The Chinese believe that they have the expertise to do this by 
cutting down costs and time. 
6. Provide quality equipment and material at market prices;  
7. Ensure effective technical assistance: Again the Chinese are emphasising that, they have the 
capacity and expertise to provide products and know-how to their African counterparts. 
8. Pay experts according to local standards: Due to the large amount of imported labour that 
usually come to Africa as an attached condition to the different project requiring Chinese services, 
the Chinese seek to balance this out by paying these imported experts according to local standard 
in order to give locals an equal competive opportunity.  
As an incorporated part of these eight principles, there is a concept of tied aid projects that are 
later on turned into businesses. This has been the trend as Brautigam gives examples of Sierra 
Leone and Zambia (Brautigam, 2009). The Chinese usually start with aid packages (interest free 
loans or low interest loans) that are tied to Chinese services and good. In many examples one of 
China’s mature companies is given the contract as the main contractor which to a certain degree 
ends up making the project more business oriented than “aid”. Upon completion of the project or 
even in some cases during the lifetime of the project , these projects are then converted to 
business. This has been one main source of confusion4. As Brautigam puts it, Chinese Aid is a 
multifaceted in nature, and in order to throughly understand how China engages with Africa, one 
shouldn’t compare it with the West because that would be like comparing apples and lychees 
(Ibid., p. 163).  
One thing that most authors agree on when it comes to China’s economic cooperation with Africa, 
is that it is a multifaceted  alliance and that it is in a constant state of development: it is growing in 
size, ways of implementation and reputation. Also, as mentioned before, the eight principles on 
China’s foreign policy still remain a centre piece in how China operates in Africa today.  
                                                          
4
 Mostly on the part of the West because the West’s definition of aid does not neccessarily fit or compare to what 
China is doing.  
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7.2 Sub-conclusion 
As we observe in the section above, it is obvious that the way China deals with the outside world, 
including Africa, is very reflective of what is happening in China’s internal affairs. From the 
beginning when China was isolated and prioritised securing diplomatic ties, it dealt with the 
outside world in this manner. However, we see that throughout the history of China’s relations 
with Africa, there is a shift in China’s foreign policy as China began to put economic development 
in the center of its affairs. In writing this section, the knowledge acquired has been that, to 
properly understand the history of China-African relations, one has to investigate history of 
development in China itself which undoubtedly mirrors changes in the policies and objectives of 
the Chinese and the way China interacts with the rest of the world. 
8. The Zambian Copper Industry pre-2011 
As outlined in section 6.2 the Zambian economy is heavily reliant on its copper industry. The 
following section gives an overview of the copper industry in Zambia up until 2011. This is in order 
to reflect the stiatuion in Zambia prior to the election of President Sata in September 2011 and 
subsequent, ongoing changes being made to investment conditions. Relevant changes effecting 
the copper industry are discussed later in this paper.  
8.1 Historical overview from 1928 to 1970 
Commercial copper mining started in at the Roan Antelope Mine (now called Luanshya mine) in 
1928. Since then, copper mining has dominated the Zambian economy; High copper prices in the 
1960s and 1970s raised confidence that development through mining-income was possible. The 
rapid growth in the mining sector was expected to end poverty in the country through 
industrialization of the country (Lungu, 2008). 
Zambia attained middle-income status by 1969. Out of a population of four million; 317,150 
people were in formal employment, and of these; 75,546 were working in the mining industry 
(Ibid., 404) with 52,600 directly employed by two private mining companies. Due to a lack of 
investments from the private companies, the mines were nationalized in 1969. All the rights of 
ownership of minerals reverted to the state, and the government obtained 51 percent of all shares 
in all existing mines. In 1982, the nationalized mining companies were consolidated to form the 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). During the era of nationalized copper mines, the 
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Zambian government was able to direct profits towards building hospitals and schools, as well as 
provide subsidies to state-owned manufacturing companies and consumers. (Ibid., 404) 
8.2 Oil crises of 1970 and the subsequent effect on the copper industry 
Throughout the post-independence era, mining annually contributed to over 50% of the country's 
foreign exchange requirements, and over two-thirds of central government revenue. Following the 
oil-crisis in the 1970s, development in Zambia slowed down as copper prices collapsed. Because of 
this, the country started borrowing money in order to maintain its social provisions. After the 
second oil crisis in 1979, the country drifted into a severe debt crisis. As copper prices fell relative 
to the prices of imports, the economy collapsed at an internationally unprecedented rate. Between 
1974 and 1994 per capita income fell by 50%, leaving the country as the 25th poorest in the world. 
Major progress in terms of development however was made in the first decade of independence 
(Lungu, 2008). Throughout the economic crisis, the mining industry was treated as a cash cow, and 
milked without the corresponding investment in machinery and prospecting ventures, as had been 
the case before nationalization. With the lack of copper revenues, the government could not 
support the social infrastructure it had created. GDP per capita declined to less than 300 USD and 
over 80 percent of the population started experiencing extreme poverty, forcing the government 
to borrow for both social and economic infrastructure maintenance and balance of payments 
support. Because of the massive debt, the country had no choice but to adopt economic 
liberalization policies designed by the World Bank and IMF. The country entered its first World 
Bank structural adjustment programme in 1983 and since then, the international financial 
institutions have tightly policed Zambia’s economic policies (Ibid., 405) 
As of 1993, the World Bank required that the government study options for privatization of the 
copper mines. The government was hesitant to privatize the mines, and also the unions were 
concerned that privatization would drive down conditions for their members. However, in 1996 
Zambia qualified for the World Banks “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC) initiative. The debt 
relief meant that Zambia had to clear frequent “hurdles”, which involved an assessment of 
performance by international finance institutions' staff before debt relief was delivered. This 
eventually meant that debt relief was chosen over domestic politics (Lungu, 2008). The 
government was encouraged to deliver investor friendly reforms, which was expressed through the 
Mines and Mineral Act of 1995, replacing the Mines and Minerals Act of 1972, which regulated the 
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nationalized industry. 
The new act meant that copper removed from Zambia would be charged at the rate of 3 percent of 
the net value of the minerals produced, later amended to 2 percent which meant that Zambia had 
the lowest mining taxes compared with other mineral-rich countries in Africa and the whole world 
(Lungu, 2008). The act also permitted the government to enter into “Development Agreements” 
(DAs) with specific companies, under which more incentives than the act granted could be 
extended, including further reductions in royalty rates  (Ibid., 406). 
 
8.3 Structural adjustment policies and privatisation of the copper industry 
As stated earlier, Zambia was put under pressure by the World Bank and the IMF to liberalize its 
economy. The following section takes a closer look at what this meant to the policies of the 
Zambian government. 
 
The policies of the International financial institutions marked a shift in development thinking. The 
reforms that followed in the African countries had the goal of increasing economic growth by 
correcting imbalances between government spending and government revenues. This meant trade 
liberalization, devaluation, fiscal and monetary reforms, public enterprise reforms, and the 
deregulation of investment, labour and prices (Kragelund, 2009). These reforms were to stimulate 
the interest of foreign investors in investing in African economies which would then expand the 
production capacity, increase foreign-exchange earnings and create employment. Providing an 
environment conducive to FDI was therefore a high priority (Ibid., 489). 
With Zambia’s entrance into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995, it has made it difficult 
for the country to follow its own (protectionist trade), industrial and investment policies. The 
WTO’s Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement, which Zambia is a part of due to its 
membership from WTO, means that mandatory technology transfer and export requirements is 
not allowed. This has a direct impact on the possibilities of increasing positive spillovers, which 
could come through mandatory subcontracting schemes (Kragelund, 2009). With regards to the 
MFEZs there are, however, qualification criteria which involves technology transfer (MCTI, 2013). 
In 2011, FDI was governed by the ZDA Act, offering investors a very liberal investment climate, 
although it also introduces stricter rules on minimum investment and employment-creation 
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requirements. However it does not stipulate any requirements regarding local content, technology 
transfer, equity, employment or use of subcontractors for foreign investors, although foreign 
investors are encouraged to make a commitment to local participation. (Kragelund, 2009; 492) 
None of the industrial policies deal with the formation of linkages between TransNational 
Corporations’ (TNCs’) domestic companies. In contrast, such policies are put aside in favour of 
laissez-faire policies to attract FDI. However, the Citizen Economic Empowerment Act (CEEA) has as 
its aim to make Zambians participate in the economy by encouraging new investors to find a local 
partner and existing TNCs to sell shares to Zambians. As of 2009 when Kragelund’s report was 
written, however, the CEEA policies had not been enforced (Kragelund, 2009). 
8.4 Copper prices 
In 1960 the price of copper was at 679 USD/metric tone (mt). Between then and 1986, copper 
prices have been between 645 $/mt and 2,182 USD/mt. From 1986 copper prices increased and 
peaked in 1995 where the price stood at 2,935 USD/mt, from 1995 prices fell to 1,654 USD/mt in 
1998 and then started rising in 2003 where one metric tonne of copper stood at 1,779 USD. In 
2011 the copper prices peaked at 8,828 USD/mt. Afterwards there has been a slight drop in prices 
and in 2013 the price is 7917 USD/mt. (Mongabay, 2013) 
In 2010 Zambian revenues from mining increased by almost 50% to 750 million USD. The rise was 
explained by both the rise in copper prices and by a 16% increase in copper production. In the year 
2010 mining contributed to 11 percent of GDP, but the indirect contribution of mining might be as 
much as half the economy (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2013). Copper exports of 
5.8 billion USD accounted for 78% of the Zambian exports in 2010.(Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, 2013). 
In 2010 the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) revealed a discrepancy of 0.23 
percent between what the government said they had received and what the companies said they 
had paid, down from 1.2 percent in 2009 (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2013). 
9. Zambia’s partnership with China  
9.1 Diplomatic relations 
As mentioned previously, Sino-Zambian relations can be traced back to Zambian independence in 
1964. Following Zambia’s independence, the personal friendship between Kenneth Kaunda and 
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Zhou Enlai safeguarded close links between Zambia and the PRC, which resulted in many Chinese 
aid projects in Zambia (Kragelund, 2009). The most well-known of these being the Tazara railway 
between Zambia and Tanzania. However, since the Tanzara railway, the chinese have also been 
involved in many other aid projects in Zambia such as: building the Ministry of Defence building; 
the Mulungushi Textile Mill; the Lusaka-Kaoma Road and Serenje-Mansa Road. This gives a clear 
indication of the intense diplomatic relations between the two countries right after independence 
(Kragelund, 2009). 
9.2 Chinese aid projects 
As the majority of the businesses in Zambia during its independence were in foreign hands, China 
did not engage in any economic activities with Zambia but instead engaged with Zambia through 
its aid projects. In the late 1970s however, following China’s modernisation and its efforts to 
improve international relations with both the Soviet Union and USA, there was a withdrawal of 
Chinese activities in most of Africa going into the 1980s. Nonetheless, unlike the situation with 
most African countries, China maintained developmental and political relations with Zambia 
(Kragelund, 2009). In fact, during this period, Zambia had also udergone what was termed as the 
“Zambianisation” (nationalisation) of some of its big companies (Ibid., 644 -661). At this stage, the 
Chinese began to engage with Zambia economically:  two large construction projects were started 
in the early 1980s as well as the construction of roads in the late 1980s. Also during this period, 
the Chinese reformed their foreign aid policy and trade between the two countries remained at a 
constant, although low, level throughout the 1980s (Kragelund, 2009).  
9.3 Economic relations 
During the 1990s, Sino-Zambian relations changed from being solely in the form of development 
aid projects to being more about China’s economic interests as well, which was a reflection of the 
changes that China’s foreign aid policy was undergoing. Since the modernisation process started, 
the Chinese economy has expanded rapidly and internal competition increased pushing profit 
margins down, as well as increasing the need for natural resources. Chinese producers desperately 
wanted new markets and investment possibilities, and, due partly to the history of diplomatic and 
economic ties, Zambia soon became an ideal partner in Africa for Chinese goods and investments 
(Kragelund, 2009). Though interest in Zambia’s mineral resources was the basis for economic 
engagement with Zambia, the privatisation of the copper mines in the late 1990’s made China’s 
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new investments policies in Zambia possible. The privatisation process enabled the current 
Chinese interest in Zambia’s economy.  
9.4 Chinese investment in Zambia 
In 2001 China sent a 17-person delegation to Zambia to strengthen economic relations between 
the both countries. This also included assessing other investment opportunities and setting up a 
special Chinese fund to assist Chinese companies eager to invest in Africa (Kragelund, 2009). After 
2001, the first Chinese companies to invest in Zambia in this second phase of Sino-Zambian 
relations were those with previous experience from the Chinese development aid projects i.e. 
state-owned construction companies, farms and the occasional manufacturer, but many others 
soon followed. Some of the  well-known examples are the Zambia-China Mulungushi Textile Joint 
Venture (ZCMT), originally a Chinese development aid project from 1982. In 1998 Chinese investor 
firm bought 85 per cent of the shares of the dormant Chambishi copper mine. Privately owned 
construction company, China Hainan Zambia Ltd has been operating in Zambia for over 10 years, 
the large transnational telecommunication company Huawei started operating in Zambia in 2002; 
and the retail chain Budget Stores, also began its operations in Zambia in 2004. According to Peter 
Kragelund, based on his field work in Zambia, Chinese firms of all sizes, in all sectors of the 
economy, and with a variety of ownership structures have invested in the Zambia, even though 
neither the Chinese Embassy nor the Zambian’s have correct numbers of how many Chinese 
companies are established in Zambia (Ibid.., 2009) 
The increased number of Chinese companies across Zambia can also be attributed to the support 
and guidance that they receive from the Chinese state both at home and in Zambia and at 
different levels (Kragelund, 2009). To ease the increase of Chinese businesses in Zambia, the 
Chinese state opened its first financial institution in Africa, the Zambian branch of the ‘state-
owned commercial’ Bank of China (BOC), in Lusaka in 1997. However, the establishment of the 
bank was strictly political and entirely non-commercial as it’s main purpose is to facilitate the day-
to-day activities of Chinese companies in Zambia such as transferring money to and from China. In 
the beginning it only catered to state-owned firms, but currently the bank permits private Chinese 
operators to benefit from its services. To ease the process of investing in Zambia, the Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce has also decreed the creation of a Chinese Centre for Investment 
Promotion and Trade in Lusaka. The Centre’s main objective is to enhance the ability to discover 
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investment projects that fit the needs and goals of the PRC and provide practical support to 
Chinese companies. Also, in 2006 the Ministry of Commerce established the Association of 
Chinese Companies in Zambia (ACCZ), which is basically a Chinese Chamber of Commerce that 
provides services and information for investors and collaborates closely with Zambian institutions 
to make the daily work of its members easier.  
Finally, the Economic Counsellor’s Office at the Chinese embassy in Zambia provides investment 
advice to potential investors and helps Chinese businessmen in their dealings with Zambian 
authorities. All these actions indicate the depth of Sino –Zambian relations. It also shows the level 
of the support from the Chinese government as well as the attractiveness of the Zambian market 
for Chinese companies (Kragelund, 2009).  
9.5 Sub-conclusion 
It seems that until now, the Chinese have been the ones to in control however, in later sections of 
this project it can be seen that, following the 2011 elections in Zambia, it seems that Zambian 
politicians are becoming more vocal about their stance on investment conditions and the way in 
which Chinese enterprises operate in Zambia. This new attitude will be further discusssed in later 
sections. 
10. Zambia’s copper industry and investment climate up until the 2011 
elections 
The benefits of Chinese investment in the mining sector, especially at a time when other investors 
pulled back and reduced their mining activities when copper prices slumped in 2009 did not go 
unappreciated by the Zambian government and the previous mines minister Maxwell Mwale 
publicly praised the Chinese referring to them as “our all-weather friends” (Gondwe, 2010). 
However, there was also a sentiment expressed by some that although it is fair that investors gain 
from their investment, such investment should also benefit local Zambians and that it is the duty 
of the government to ensure that this happens. (Gondwe, 2010). It seems that in many ways the 
balance of favour was heavily tipped in the favour of Chinese (and other foreign) investors, as 
presented in the following subsections.  
10.1 Regulatory context of Zambia 
It is important to understand a country’s regulative context in order to be able to see if it can 
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benefit from FDI. Thus, the potential must be understood in relations to the effectiveness of local 
business regulations (Haglund, 2008). In many African countries the capacity to regulate effectively 
is undermined by weak political and regulatory institutions (Ibid., 548) It should be noted that 
Chinese investors seem perfectly capable of following rules and norms when operating in a 
developed country with strong systems of corporate regulation (Haglund, 2008). It should be noted 
that Haglund’s report was written in 2008, before the PF government came to power under 
Michael Sata.  According to Haglund, the regulatory context in Zambia as of 2008 can be described 
as one with a relative respect for property rights and well-developed legislation which provides 
mandates for regulatory agencies. However, the Zambian regulatory environment was also 
characterized by significant shortfalls in institutional capacity, with weak reporting and 
accountability, and pervasive political interference (Haglund, 2008). 
10.2 Institutional capacity    
The mining sector regulation is hampered by a shortage of skilled inspectors and the resourses 
required to physically inspect the mining sector. Salaries in the mining and environmental 
ministries are relative low and therefore uncompetitive, which makes it difficult for the ministries 
to hire skilled inspectors (Haglund, 2008). The growth in the mining sector has also had its impact, 
because foreign mining companies will hire the available skilled labour (Ibid.). Haglund describes 
the legislation as being outdated; it fails to incentivise firms to be compliant. The fines issued by 
The Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) when firms are non-compliant equate to just 37 USD. 
Issues of a lack of capacity are also seen in tax collection and fiscal regulation which means that it 
is impossible for government to validate that mining companies actually pay what they ought to 
(Haglund, 2008). 
10.3 Reporting and accountability 
Zambia's Environmental Act and associated statutory instruments places the onus on companies to 
semi-annually self-report their performance against environmental standards to the Environmental 
Council of Zambia (ECZ) (Haglund, 2008). Self reporting may be seen as a way to overcome capacity 
constraints, but self-reporting is complicated by a lack of common standards and reporting formats 
for different investors. Also, self-reporting may be seen as a specific way to deal with investors as 
in “working with investors in partnership”, which means that the agencies might have been too 
light-handed. Haglund concludes that this has resulted in limited follow-up on foreign mining 
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companies’ cases of either incomplete self-reporting or outright non-submission of reports 
(Haglund, 2008). 
10.4 Centralisation and interventionism 
Centralized control over the affairs of the state is still a hallmark of African countries (Haglund, 
2008). Parliamentary oversight is often limited, ministries may be filled with loyalists and the 
presidency may emerge as the dominant arena for decision-making, to the point where regular 
ministerial structures are relegated to an executants role (Haglund, 2008). In the case of Zambia, 
the permanent secretaries of ministries are political appointments, rather than career civil servants 
who represent a “institutional memory” of a ministry, and are periodically reshuffled by the 
president (Ibid., 562) 
Executives of large mining firms are expected to visit and brief the president on their investment 
plans, and research indicates that investors in developing countries may prefer this less formal and 
personalized means of contracting (Haglund, 2008). However, the risk is that although it may 
enable the Chinese and other investors to “get things done”, it may very well undermine the 
effectiveness of already weak regulatory institutions (Ibid.). In a report from the World Bank it is 
stated that exploration and mining companies seek a stable, predictable and transparent 
regulatory environment in which the rules are clearly set out and administered on an equitable 
basis (The World Bank Zambia, 2011). 
10.5 Development Agreements 
In the late 1990’s, following intense pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (WB), the state-owned Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZZCM) was split into 
seven sections and privatised (Dymond et al., 2007).  At this time copper prices were low and the 
outlook gloomy but Zambia needed to attract and secure investors to take on the resulting small 
companies. In order to help achieve this, investing companies were able to draw up individual 
Development Agreements (DAs) with the Zambian government. These DAs were drawn up behind 
closed doors and were not made public (the DAs were subsequently uncovered by research for the 
report entitled “For whom the windfalls” (Fraser and Lungu, 2007) and five of them are published 
on an independent website www.minewatchzambia.org) and have been pointed to by many as 
being a significant cause for Zambia’s lack of financial benefit from its mining industry (Dymond et 
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al., 2007) (The World Bank Zambia, 2011) (Mines and Communities, 2008) (Zambian Economist, 
2011). One report refers to the DAs as:  
...binding and legal documents outlining taxes and regulations for mining companies 
that left the government bereft of significant mining profits and unable to perform its 
role as an effective regulator. (Mines and Communities, 2008).  
It is generally accepted that the DAs gave investors highly favourable conditions of investment. For 
example companies were able to negotiate royalty rates lower than the already low 3% as per the  
Zambian Mines and Mineral Act. In the case of the  DA between The Government of the Republic 
of Zambia (GRZ) and Chambishi Metals Plc., royalty rates were set at only 2% (The Government of 
Zambia and Chambishi Metals PLC, 1998) while other companies are reported as setting royalty 
rates as low as 0.6% (Dymond et al., 2007). Furthermore, these agreements included fixed-time 
stability clauses (of between 10 and 15 years) during which time the contracts cannot be modified 
without mutual consent. To give an example, in the DA between The Government of the Republic 
of Zambia (GRZ) and Chambishi Metals Plc. among the many various conditions and allowances it 
is stated that for a period of fifteen years commencing on the Effective date the GRZ will not: 
increase corporate income tax or withholding tax rates applicable to the Company; Amend the 
VAT and corporate tax regimes applicable to the Company; Impose new taxes on the conduct of 
Normal Operations; Increase the agreed rate of royalty; Increase import duty rates applicable to 
the Company; Impose other royalties or duties on Normal Operations (The Government of Zambia 
and Chambishi Metals PLC, 1998). Furthermore, this particular DA allows the Company to “bring 
into and retain in Zambia such non-Zambian citizens as, in the reasonable judgement of the 
Company’s management, are required for the efficient and successful operation of the Facilities...” 
Although it is also stated that the Company will not discriminate against “comparably trained, 
qualified and experienced Zambian citizens” There isn’t any real hard push for the Company to 
prioritise employment of Zambian nationals or penalty for not doing so. An additional point to 
note about the DAs is that they were made between the relevant Company and the Head of 
Government, without involving other stakeholders. 
Development Agreements were abolished under the Mines and Minerals Act 2008 (Zambian 
Economist, 2011), however companies continued to benefit from them for the duration of their 
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stability period (Mines and Communities, 2008) and rejected calls from the Government for a new, 
more balanced tax regime (The World Bank Zambia, 2011). It might be that the Government is 
powerless to make changes to the existing DAs and that they will have to simply run their course 
(for example the DA between GRZ and Chambishi Metals PLC as mentioned earlier, was signed on 
the 11th of September 1998 with a stability period of 15 years. Therefore it could be argued that 
the conditions laid out in the agreement are valid until the 11th of September2013).   
Reversal of windfall tax 
Responding to falling copper prices in 2009 and the refusal of companies to accept amendments 
to the DAs (Mines and Communities, 2008), the Zambian government reversed the windfall tax 
(Shacinda, 2009) which had been introduced in 2008 in an attempt to counter generous tax 
concessions provided by the Zambian government under the DAs, as discussed above. The 
establishment of the Chambishi MFEZ further gave investors (mainly Chinese at the time) many 
financial concessions as presented below. 
10.6 Establishment of Multi-Facility Economic Zones  in Zambia under the 
umbrella term “Cooperation Zones” 
In the following text, an outline of “cooperation zones” will be given. The term cooperation zone 
includes EZPs, MFEZs industrial parks etc.   
 
Brautigam writes in her journal from 2011, that Chinese leaders have described the cooperation 
zones in the African countries as an important measure to help African countries develop 
industries and expand local employment (Brautigam, 2011)  which is something Zambia is in need 
of, bearing the unemployment of youth in mind. However, some worry that the zones might be 
primarily “political investments”, linked to Beijing’s long-term geo-strategic ambitions, and unlikely 
to foster sustainable local development. Another interpretation of these cooperation zones is that 
they might be used by the Chinese for transshipment of Chinese products, for relabelling and re-
exporting to protected markets in Africa (Ibid.). The general outcome of Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) in Africa has been lacklustre. In some countries zones are only partially functioning; some 
have even been abandoned (Brautigam, 2011). Brautigam writes, that for a zone to be successful, 
it has to attract foreign and local investment, create African employment, promote exports and 
elevate industrial competitiveness in African countries in an environmentally and socially 
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sustainable manner. On the other hand, if these zones end up as isolated Chinese enclaves; do not 
employ Africans or employ them only at the lowest levels; fail to transfer or diffuse technology and 
”know how” to local people; adopt worker safety standards that are lower than those outside the 
zone, or if the zone serves as an uneconomic “prestige project”, made to get other benefits, such 
as access to natural resources (Brautigam, 2011).  
As of mid 2010, there were 6 Cooperation zones under construction. Of these 6 zones 5 of them 
will focus on mostly manufacturing, while one zone, the Chambishi Zone in Zambia will 
concentrate on mineral processing while the Luska subzone will concentrate on garments, food, 
appliances, tobacco and electronics (Brautigam, 2011). 
 
10.7 Establishment of the Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone 
 
Zambia’s intentions 
According to statements issued by the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry (Zambia 
Development Agency, n.d.)The Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ) was established as 
part of the Japanese Government’s “Triangle of Hope” (ToH) initiative, introduced in 2005.  This 
initiative aims at:  
...creating the platform for Zambia to achieve economic development by attracting 
significant domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI) through a strengthened policy 
and legislative environment.(Zambia Development Agency, n.d.).  
The document by the Zambia Development Agency continues to state that not only is it intended 
that the MFEZ will boost Zambia’s trade and manufacturing sectors directly but that this in itself 
will have many spill-over effects into other sectors. The Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry 
also highlights the importance of having good physical infrastructure as well as effective 
administration with clear rules and regulations in order to attract investors. MFEZs in Zambia are 
administered, controlled and regulated by the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) in line with 
legislation governing the MFEZs. 
China’s intentions 
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According to Brautigam (2009) at the same time as the Zambian government was working out a 
legal framework to establish a Multi-Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ), the China Nonferrous Mining 
Company (CNMC) began to implement plans to develop a metallurgy industrial cluster on land it 
held in Chambishi. The aim of the zone was to “...develop a cluster of firms that would pull some 
of the industrial chain back to Africa by producing bars, wires, cables, and so on from raw copper, 
nickel, and other metals mined in Zambia and the region nearby” (Brautigam, 2009).  
The Chambishi MFEZ is particularly special as it is one of China’s first two overseas special 
economic zones, with the second being in Mauritius (Brautigam, 2009). Furthermore, the CNMC is 
regarded as being the first Chinese non-ferrous metal company to adopt the “go abroad” policy as 
discussed in section 7 (CNMC web page, n.d.). 
Operating parameters of the Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone at the time it was set up 
The 11.58 square kilometre Chambizi MFEZ is managed by the Zambia-China Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ)  
According to the ZDA (Zambia Development Agency, n.d.) there are four main investment 
incentives available to companies once they are approved to operate within the MFEZ: 
1.  A corporate tax rate of 0% for 5 years from commencement of operations, taxation on 
only 50% of profits in year 6 through year 8 and taxation on 75% of profits in years 9 and 
10. 
2. 5-year exemption on dividend taxes from the first year of declaration of dividends. 
3. 5-year custom duties exemption on imported machinery and equipment. 
4. Improvement allowance of 100% Capital Expenditure on improvements or upgrading of 
infrastructure 
The above incentives are applicable to all eligible investors – domestic and foreign. There is also a 
set of conditions that companies must fulfil to be considered eligible: 
1. Invest not less than the equivalent of USD 500,000; 
2. Be in a multi-facility economic zone priority sector; 
3. Demonstrate that the investment will provide a number of benefits (16 in total) concerning 
issues such as amount and quality of local employment creation, introduction and transfer 
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of technology, production of new products, environmental impact, etc. 
Once a business enterprise is granted a licence to operate in a MFEZ there are further conditions 
that it must adhere to (outlined in section 76 of the ZDA act) as well as various penalties (fines, 
imprisonment, suspension or revocation of licence) that can be imposed if the provisions of the 
ZDA Act or the MFEZ General Regulations are contravened.  
However, it still possible for business enterprises to operate within the MFEZ even without the 
MFEZ licensing although they are not entitled to receive any of the incentives listed above and 
instead operate within the normal operating parameters of the rest of the country (zda.org, n.d.). 
Status of the Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone in 2013 
 When the Chambishi MEFZ first opened for investments it was estimated that within five years 
there would be a total of fifty companies operating within the MFEZ (Daily Parliamentary Debates 
July, 2009) 
Originally ten companies committed to invest in the Chambishi MFEZ. All ten were Chinese 
companies with a total amount of investment pledged of USD 414,300,000. The ten companies 
represented different sectors covering mining (copper), manufacturing (rolling steel, sulphuric 
acid, mechanical components), and Construction (building materials, steel) (Daily Parliamentary 
Debates July, 2009). 
According to recent (April 2013) statements issued by the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and 
Industry Permanent Secretary Stephen Mwansa, the latest total of companies investing 
in/expressing interest in investing in the MFEZ now stands at 30 (Namutowe, 2013) with 18 
enterprises actually operating in the zone, including one wholly Zambian owned SME (Banda, 
2013). Among the companies that have pledged investment are a local plastic manufacturing 
company (UK Zambians, 2011), a copper foil plant, a mining equipment manufacturer and a new 
copper smelter (Mutumweno, 2013). In addition, in 2013 STANBIC Bank Zambia became the first 
financial institution to open a branch in the MFEZ (Kachemba, 2013a) and it is estimated that more 
service providers will follow suit (Mutumweno, 2013). According to the Project’s Finance Minister, 
Zhou Shiwei, the MDEZ has, to date, created 7,000 jobs for local Zambians (Lusaka Voice, 2013).  
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10.8 Linkages resulting from Chinese investments at the Chambishi Copper 
Smelter 
Chinese investments in Zambia have mainly been directed into the sectors of construction, 
manufacturing and mining. Most of the big investments in manufacturing are in mining related 
activities and these include the Chambishi Copper Smelter Limited (Baah and Jauch, 2009). The 
manufacturing sector was the most negatively affected by the structural adjustment programmes 
in Zambia, but in 2007 showed some improvements, which were attributed to increased value 
addition in the sector. However, according to Bahh and Jauch (2009), it is not possible to say if this 
growth can be attributed to Chinese owned companies (Baah and Jauch, 2009). The former 
minister of commerce, trade and industry, Felix Mutati, contended that China has been good for 
Zambia because China is bringing in investment, world class technology, job and value addition 
(Ibid., 176) According to a paper from the Journal of development economics, FDI has a number of 
proven attributes: it improves managerial knowledge and skills; increases efficiency and 
productivity; and provides a wide array of goods and services to the economy. The underlying 
premise is that multinational corporations possess superior intangible assets including technology, 
managerial skills, export contacts, as well as reputation and good will. Since multinational 
corporations possess these intangible assets and can transfer them to their subsidiaries located 
abroad and subsequently to local firms through technology spillover effects, then technology 
spillover is expected to raise productivity and efficiency at firm and sector level. Of these beneficial 
aspects of inward FDI, technology transfer is often singled out as of greater relevance to 
developing countries (Bwalya, 2006). The question then being if this technology transfer happens 
in Zambia in regards to Chinese FDI. 
Transfer of capital and technology 
According to Bahh and Jauch (2009), Chinese investments into the manufacturing and mining 
sector are increasingly contributing to capital and technology transfer to Zambia. The NFC Africa 
Mining Plc Chabishi mines has committed capital investment to achieve production levels of 
between 5,250 and 6,000 metric tonnes of ore per day within four years with an expenditure 
estimated at US$ 70 million. The Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS) is also said to be a world-class 
smelter with the state-of-the-art technology (Baah and Jauch, 2009). 
Effects on local industry and downstream operations 
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The effect of Chinese investment on local industry and downstream operations is mixed, 
Dependent on what sectors one is looking at. In particular in the textile sector, there are forward 
and backward linkages. 
The Chambishi Copper Smelter (CSS) will depend on processing copper from the expanding copper 
mining activities across the country (Baah and Jauch, 2009). Investments in the Chambishi mines 
have raised production activity and are contributing to capital expansion. There are, however, only 
a few forward and backwards linkages in mining (Baah and Jauch, 2009). However the effect of 
Asian FDI on local suppliers has been generally positive and there are indications that those local 
suppliers who meet the standards requirements, are often given business contracts (Baah and 
Jauch, 2009). 
Subcontracting to local companies is a way in which there can be positive spillover effects. But 
even though subcontracting occurred at the Chambishi mine, and during the construction of the 
Chambishi MFEZ and Chambishi Copper Smelter (Daily Parliamentary Debates July, 2009), a study 
revealed that the major work and contracts are often awarded to foreign companies. A few small 
Zambian companies are sometimes given contracts for small jobs, but as one local Zambian 
contractor noted, foreign companies often come with their own workforce, which deprives locals 
of much needed jobs (Baah and Jauch, 2009). 
10.9 Diplomatic relations 
An example of the previous MMD government’s eagerness to please Chinese investors can be 
seen during the early development talks on the Chambishi MFEZ. Originally the Zambian MMD 
government offered to set up the investment zone exclusively for Chinese enterprises. 
Interestingly it was the Chinese who rejected this idea stating a need for more diverse foreign 
investment with involvement from investors from countries other than China (Sharife, 2011).   
A sign of the diplomatic warmth between China and Zambia under the previous president, Mr 
Banda can be seen in the long, ten-day state visit that Mr Banda undertook in 2010. During this 
visit Mr Banda emphasized the Zambian Government’s drive to ensure that Zambia provides an 
investor-friendly atmosphere – both for local and foreign investments. Current joint projects 
between the two nations were highlighted and Chinese business delegates were assured that any 
future investments in Zambia would be safe (Daily Parliamentary Debates March, 2010) 
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However, in Zambia Mr Banda was criticised for the length of the State visit, especially as it 
coincided with devastating flooding, considered the worst in the country since 1958 and affecting 
approximately 100,000 families in five provinces of Zambia (IFRC DREF, 2010). Further criticisms 
were raised over the fact that the issue of non-adherence to and abuse of Zambian labour laws 
was not on the agenda for discussion during the visit (Daily Parliamentary Debates March, 2010) 
despite the issue having been raised and debated in the Zambian parliament prior to the visit 
(Daily Parliamentary Debates July, 2009).  This contrasts with President Sata’s recent State Visit to 
China (April 4  – 11, 2013) where new investments in Zambia were also discussed and agreed on. 
However, according to statements made by the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry 
Permanent Secretary Stephen Mwansa, President Sata set a definite focus on the importance of 
adherence to Zambian labour laws: “The President also assured investors that as long as they 
invested and adhered to the Zambian labour laws, they were assured of a good return from their 
investment,” (Namutowe, 2013). 
10.10 Sub-conclusions 
The policies of the IFIs, and the reforms that followed created an environment in which 
liberalization, devaluation and deregulation of labour and prices were to stimulate the interest of 
foreign investors in investing in African economies. The cooperation zones may be seen as an 
extension of these policies; However the zones are only effective in developing a country's 
economy insofar that there is some diffusion of technology, know-how and linkages. It should not 
just be an isolated foreign enclave. 
In the case of Zambia, according to Bahh and Jauch (2009), Chinese investments into the 
manufacturing and mining sector are increasingly contributing to capital and technology transfer, 
but there are only few forward and backward linkages in mining. 
Subcontracting is a way in which there can be positive spillover effects, but even though there has 
been subcontracting at the Chambishi mines and during the construction of the CCS, major work 
and contracts is often awarded to foreign companies. This is depriving local Zambians of much 
needed jobs, which is a problem due to high youth unemployment. The Sata-government has tried 
to combat the youth-unemployment through focusing on promoting entrepreneurship and a 
strengthening of youth skills.  
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11. Change in government in Zambia in 2011 
 
11.1 New government new rhetoric 
Michael Sata was elected president of Zambia in September 2011 with promises to improve 
mining conditions and assurances that Zambians would receive an increased share of mining 
profits (Els, 2012). Mr Sata was previously defeated in the 2006 elections when he ran a campaign 
with a particularly aggressive focus on the negative side of foreign (Chinese) investment, with 
special regard to  Chinese labour practices (Wells, 2011a).  A number of quotes by Sata at some of 
his pre-election rallies give an idea of the strength of Sata’s anti-Chinese campaign: “Zambia has 
been mortgaged to China” and “These Chinese are infesters, not investors” (Hinds, 2012) 
11.1.1 Emphasis on adherence to Zambian labour laws 
Since the 2011 election, Michael Sata’s PF Government seems to have moderated its approach 
towards Chinese investments and is instead focusing on strengthening Sino-Zambia relations. This 
can be seen both by the statements published by the government as well as by the importance 
being placed on cementing diplomatic relations between the two countries and a drive to increase 
Chinese investments in Zambia. However, there also is a definite and consistent message being 
made by Zambia that any investment has to be made according to Zambian law and that investors 
who do not adhere to this will be dealt with accordingly.  There are many examples of this, both in 
general terms but also with a focus that is specifically on Chinese investors. 
11.1.2 General call for adherence to and respect for Zambian law 
Generally the government has taken many opportunities to ensure that its message regarding the 
need for companies to adhere to Zambian labour laws is heard by all sectors of society. In April 
2013 the Labour and Social Security Deputy Minister, Ronald Chitotela discussed the issue on 
Radio Icengelo (“light of the copperbelt”) saying that it was against Zambian law for employers to 
verbally abuse workers or fire employees without giving due reason. He also stressed that the 
government is in the process of reforming labour laws with the intention of ending casualisation  
(Ntanda, 2013). Mr Chitotela is quoted as saying: 
The law is for our friends who have come to assist us in building the economy and 
those operating Zambian companies and that not following labour laws and are 
ignoring government directives to do so will have their work permits revoked.  
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     (Ntanda, 2013) 
11.1.3 Call for adherence to Zambian law directed at Chinese investors (actual and potential) 
According to press reports of the first post-election meeting between President Sata and the 
Chinese Ambassador to Zambia, Zhou Yuxiao, President Sata reiterated the need for Chinese 
investors to adhere to local labour laws (Mutale, 2013). 
In a recent (26 April 2013) speech made at the opening of the Zambia-China Economic and Trade 
Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) general service building in the Chambishi MFEZ, Mr Emmanuel Chenda, 
Minister of Commerce stressed the government’s confidence in the ability for Chinese investment 
in Zambia to help improve the local economy and create jobs. The importance of continued, and 
increased, bilateral ties between China and Zambia was also stressed by Mr Chenda. (Wangwe, 
2013a). At the same occasion the Deputy Minister of Labour, Mr Rayford Mbulu emphasised the 
fact that “enterprises operating within the (Chambishi MFEZ) zone must adhere to labour laws and 
various government pronouncements through Statutory Instruments relating to labour matters.” 
(Wangwe, 2013a)   
Although it could be considered as just “talk” the consistency of the call by Sata’s Government to 
respect Zambian law and the levels at which this message is being given (from community level to 
the highest diplomatic levels) give it more credibility than this and possibly forewarns of tangible 
changes in the investment environment. In the following section some concrete examples that 
help illustrate the reality of the rhetoric of policy changes are discussed.  
11.2 From rhetoric to action – examples of concrete changes affecting the copper 
industry 
However, rhetoric is not enough to make real changes. In the following section a review is made of 
concrete steps that the PF government and President Sata have made to put their rhetoric into action.  
11.2.1 Wages 
In 2012 the Zambian government raised monthly minimum wages for domestic workers, shop 
workers and general workers who are not represented by any trade union and not covered by 
collective bargaining agreements (United Nations Zambia, 2012).  Minimum wages were raised to 
ZMK 420,000 per month (USD ) for domestic workers and ZMK 700,000 (USD ) for shop workers 
(Government of Zambia, 2012). This shows an increase of approximately 60%  from previous 
minimum wages of K250,000 and 420,000 respectively (United Nations Zambia, 2012). Although 
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this does not directly affect mine workers employed by Chinese enterprises, it does signal 
expectations of an overall improvement in wages as: it can be assumed that workers represented 
by trade unions will not earn below the minimum wage.  It could also be further assumed that a 
worker in a mine/smelter would earn at least as much as, if not more than, for example, a cleaner 
or handyman.  It has been reported that President Sata has indicated that a non-unionised 
industrial worker should expect to earn a minimum wage of USD 195 per month (Ghaffari, 2011). 
Although this is unsubstantiated and does not have any official source it does show that the issue 
is being discussed and that people have ideas about what would be a “fair” minimum wage for 
industrial workers such as those working in mines or smelters.  
Following the large increases in the official minimum wages for the three categories of workers as 
presented above, many mineworkers also demanded similar increases of up to 50% (Chanda, 
2013). Calls were also made for wage increases by the Mineworkers Union of Zambia, with the 
President of the organisation, Chishimba Nkole stating: 
While pay demands at most operations are for increases of less than 50 percent, we 
feel there is the justification in some cases, where the wages are very low, for raises of 
that percentage (Els, 2012). 
There are, to date, continued calls from unions and workers to increase wages in the copper 
industry (Wangwe, 2013b) with some negotiations that began at the end of 2012 now bearing fruit 
with acceptance of increased wage offers. For example having asked for an increase of 15% in 
Novmber 2012 (Bariyo, 2012) workers accepted the Lumwama copper mine’s offer of an increase 
of 10% in May 2013 (Bariyo, 2013). 
11.2.2 Health and Safety 
The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report “You’ll be fired if you refuse” (Wells, 2011b) highlights a 
lack of regular inspections by the Zambian Mines Safety Department as contributing to poor and 
dangerous working conditions for miners employed both in Chinese state-owned as well as other 
multinational copper mining operations in Zambia.  As discussed earlier, this lack of inspection and 
follow-up is partly attributed in the HRW report to understaffing and underfunding of the Zambian 
Mines Safety Department due to some extent to a hiring freeze imposed by the previous 
Movement for Multi party Democracy (MMD) government  combined with inadequate budget 
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support. However a recent follow-up report by HRW (Human Rights Watch, 2013) shows that the 
present PF government has already made substantial progress in this area with the Mines Safety 
Department approved budget for 2013 increasing to 5.66 million Kwacha from 3.11 million 
Kwacha in 2012. In addition the department has been able to advertise for six more inspectors as a 
start to filling the 26 vacant positions (15 of which are for position of inspector) in the department 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013).  
This demonstrates a commitment by the current government to strengthening its capacity to 
enforce health and safety laws, thereby improving the working environment for miners across the 
country. By taking practical and visible steps in this way the government also sends a signal that its 
stance on ensuring that companies adhere to Zambian labour laws goes beyond rhetoric and into 
action. It is, however, too early to see whether the number of new inspectors employed will lead 
to more proactive spot checks and more detailed follow-up. Furthermore it is not clear when the 
department will be able to fill the remaining vacant positions once the six new inspectors have 
been hired.  
11.2.3 Monitoring and accountability 
In the 2013 budget announced in late 2012 (Chikwanda, Minister of Finance, 2012), the Finance 
Minister, Mr Alexander Chikwanda, emphasised that there were problems to be addressed 
regarding the management of mineral resources, including a lack of systems to monitor and 
account for what is being produced and exported. He voiced concerns that this lack of oversight 
can result in a loss in revenue as well as planning difficulties for the country. This echoes the 
discussion presented in section 10.2. In order to address this the following measures were 
announced: 
 Adequate resourcing and equipping the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Development 
Adequately to enable it to assess the nature, quality and quantity of minerals being mined 
and exported. 
 Presentation of a Bill to strengthen penal sanctions for false reporting of mineral 
production and export information. This entails that all mineral exports and proceeds will 
be strictly monitored through an integrated framework. 
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This is a definite move towards taking control and holding companies more accountable for the 
materials (raw and processed) that are exported out of Zambia and is a far cry from the more carte 
blanche approach followed by the DAs which have clauses such as: 
3.1 The Company may market and export without further reference to GRZ the Plant 
Products and shall have sole control and management of the sale of such Plant 
Products, including the forward selling of such Plant Products...  (The Government of 
Zambia and Chambishi Metals PLC, 1998) 
Furthermore, it is a step towards opening up of information and creating a more transparent 
environment. 
11.2.4 Taxation 
As mentioned earlier, taxation has been a long-standing cause of controversy with numerous 
debates and discussions about how to deal with the issue (Daily Parliamentary Debates March, 
2012) (Daily Parliamentary Debates November, 2012). One message is clear, however, that the 
Zambian government intends on redressing an unfavourable (to Zambia) balance in terms of 
revenue generated in the copper industry. The aim is clear, as stated by the Vice-President: “We 
want our share of the value added in the copper industry. We want it at approximately fifty-fifty 
between the investor and the Government” (Daily Parliamentary Debates March, 2012) 
In his budget speech (Chikwanda, Minister of Finance, 2012) the Minister of Finance stated that   
the Government will undertake a holistic tax reform in 2013. Concrete measures proposed in the 
budget that have relevance for the copper mining industry, especially targeted at the MFEZs 
include: 
 A requirement for tax incentives to be granted only when the investor meets their 
obligations related to employment creation for Zambians. This will be done by amending 
the Zambian Development Agency (ZDA) Act, the Income Tax Act and the Customs and 
Excise Act, to make the realisation of employment pledges by investors an essential trigger 
for them to access the incentives. 
 to revise upwards to 20 percent from zero the Withholding Tax payable on any 
management fees, consultancy fees or interest payments to a non-resident contractor by a 
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person developing a MFEZ or an Industrial Park as well as any person operating in a MFEZ 
or an Industrial Park. 
 To change the effective date on which tax exemptions on business profits and dividends for 
businesses developing or operating in priority sectors, MFEZs and Industrial Parks take 
effect. The effective date of the exemptions will now be the date of commencement of 
business operations instead of the date of first declaration of profits or dividends, currently 
in place. 
 To standard rate goods and services when supplied to or imported by businesses operating 
in MFEZs or Industrial Parks.  
 Exemption from customs duty that is granted as an incentive will only apply to goods that 
are not locally produced. 
(Chikwanda, Minister of Finance, 2012) 
All of the above measures show a radical departure from the existing incentives (as outlined in 
section 10.8.3) currently offered within the Chambishi MFEZ. There are three main areas that the 
above measures address: 
1. Employment of Zambians – tying tax incentives to employment creation for Zambians 
appears to be a very determined attempt to ensure job creation at the local level. If it 
works this could be very positive for Zambians, it remains to be seen, however, how the 
relevant Acts will be amended  and how this will be monitored and enforced.  
2. Increase of revenue to the Zambian government – By increasing the Withholding Tax from 
zero to 20%; standard rating goods and services supplied to/imported by businesses; and 
granting customs duty exemption only on goods that are not locally produced, the 
government will receive an instant boost to revenue provided by enterprises in the 
Chambishi MFEZ. 
3. Improvements in linkages between Zambian suppliers and enterprises operating within the 
zone:  By specifying that exemption on customs duty is only applicable to goods that are 
not locally produced, the government is not only improving the competitiveness of locally 
produced goods but it is also providing an incentive for enterprises to take a closer look at 
locally available supplies. In addition, as the withholding tax is payable on payments to a 
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non-resident contractor there is, again, more incentive to harness local capacity and 
employ Zambians to carry out some of the consultancy work, etc. instead of outsourcing 
from abroad. 
11.2.5 Development of transport network 
In a landlocked country such as Zambia, having a good road and rail network can be seen as vital 
both in terms of bringing in supplies but also in terms of shipping products out (for example: 
transporting copper ore from copper mines to the Chambishi copper smelter and then 
transporting the resulting blister copper and sulphuric acid to consumers).  
In 2012 the government launched the “Link Zambia 8000” Project (Road Traffic Technology, 2012) 
which has the following aims as stated in the document “Link Zambia 8000 Project” (Road 
Development Agency, 2012):  
 Transforming Zambia into a truly land linked country 
 Creating 24,000 jobs, especially among the youth  
 Promote the growth of local contracting industry 
 Contribute to reduction of road user costs and transit times across Zambia 
 Create economic growth poles and wealth in outlying areas 
Within the project are plans for work on 37 roads across all 10 of Zambia’s provinces with projects 
ranging from building new stretches of road, upgrading existing roads (e.g. from “dirt” to “tarmac” 
status) to bridge construction (e.g. building bridges to replace existing pontoon/ferry systems 
across rivers)(Road Development Agency, 2012). 
The Link Zambia 8000 Project is already underway with funding from the 2013 budget with K3.4 
trillion earmarked for road network development (Chikwanda, Minister of Finance, 2012). 
Furthermore, as part of six new multilateral agreements signed between Zambia and China in April 
2013,  some of the money that Zambia will receive as a concessional loan from the China 
Development Bank (total amount is undisclosed) will be used on the Mansa-Luwingu Road, while 
the Export and Import Bank of China is reported providing money for upgrading the Mbala-
Nakonde Road (Siame, 2013) (State House of the Republic of Zambia, n.d.). Both of these roads 
have long been requested by stakeholders in the relevant areas (Zambia News and Information 
Service, 2013) (Kafue, 2013) and are components of the Link Zambia 8000 Project. 
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Furthermore, with direct impact on the Chambishi MFEZ the contract has been signed for 
construction of a 45km long dual carriageway from Kitwe to Chingola. This is regarded as having 
particular importance both in terms of developing the copper industry as “the route carries a lot of 
international traffic and links the Copperbelt and North Western Zambia to the rest of the country, 
and beyond Zambia’s border” (Road Development Agency Zambia, 2013) as well as improved 
quality of life and safety for people living in the area as the increased traffic attributed to 
increased mining activities has led to significant congestion and an increase in fatal traffic 
accidents with 50 people being injured and 20 fatalities in 2012 (Road Development Agency 
Zambia, 2013). 
11.2.6 Partnership with Zambian enterprises 
Although many tenders have so far been won by Chinese companies, President Sata has reiterated 
that it is not the nationality of the company that matters, of more importance is to get the job 
done. This is also demonstrated by the fact that countries such as the United States of America 
(USA) have also been invited to submit tenders for “...a large proportion of the RDA’s Link Zambia 
8000 Project” (Department Of State, 2013). 
Furthermore, according to a statement issued by the Director and Chief Executive Officer of the 
RDA (Road Development Agency Zambia, 2013), specific measures have been put in place to 
support local contractors so that they can also benefit from the implemented road projects. 
Measures include: 
 The setting up of a special loan facility with the Finance Bank Zambia to enable Small and 
Medium Scale contractors to acquire equipment; 
 Development of a policy with a 20% subcontracting to Small and Medium Scale 
Contractors’ component  applicable to every contract that is awarded to large or foreign 
contractors.  
This greatly enhance the physical infrastructure necessary to attract investors in the copper 
industry (by provision of good quality roads both within the Zambian copperbelt region as well as 
the country as a whole with improved access to neighbouring countries). It also shows clearly how 
Chinese investment and partnership can be used by the Zambian Government to implement some 
of their own development plans (i.e. the Link Zambia 8000 Project) as well as fulfil election 
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promises made by President Sata regarding upgrading and constructing roads (Lusaka Times, 
2012) 
11.2.7 Improving the investment climate for Small and Medium Enterprises and encouraging 
entrepreneurship 
The importance of manufacturing is outlined in a sectoral profile of manufacturing from the ZDA, it 
is stated that “the sector is of vital importance importance in relation to the country's 
macroeconomic strategy for encouraging broad based economic growth” (UNCTAD, 2011) 
it is stated that, because of this, the government has put in place measures to support 
manufacturing activities, such as the establishment of MFEZs and industrial parks (Ibid.) According 
to the ZDA, the sector has attracted a high amount of investment in resent years, where FDIs 
totaled about 1.200 mio. USD as of 2009 (Ibid.). Manufacturing from basic metal products and 
fabricated metal products stood at only one percent each (UNCTAD, 2011). the government had, 
when this report was written in 2011, given incentives to support new business that process 
copper rather than exporting the raw copper. 
 
The 2013 budget (Chikwanda, Minister of Finance, 2012) also identifies and discusses constraints 
faced by the manufacturing sector in Zambia. These are presented in the budget speech as 
including: 
 Weak forward and backward linkages 
 Underutilisation of available capacity 
 Narrow range of products 
 High cost of production 
 Limited access to long term financing 
 Low skill levels 
 Outdated technology 
Some of the reasons lying behind these weaknesses are identified by the Minister of Finance as 
being the high cost of doing business in Zambia which “This holds back the entrepreneurial 
potential of our people and is counter-productive to investment, employment creation and 
poverty reduction” (Chikwanda, Minister of Finance, 2012).  
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In order to address the above issues, the budget places emphasis on assisting SMEs to set up and 
operate. There are a number of proposals that aim at making it easier for SMEs to do business. 
These include:  
 An increase in the threshold under which businesses are required to pay taxes on a 
turnover basis to K800 million from the current K200 million annual turnover. By this, it is 
expected that tax administration will become more efficient and the cost of tax compliance 
for micro as well as SMEs will be reduced. 
 To increase the Value Added Tax registration threshold to K800 million from the current 
K200 million. 
 To remove duty on wide range of mechanical and electrical machines and machine tools (in 
line with reducing cost of doing business in Zambia). 
(Chikwanda, Minister of Finance, 2012) 
Furthermore, in March 2013 the government issued a statement on business environment 
reforms in Zambia under the second phase of the Private Sector Development Reform Programme 
(PSDRP). The reforms highlighted as having been carried out in 2012 and planned for 2013  aim at 
making it easier to start a business or to formalise an existing business with emphasis on 
improving competitiveness and developing entrepreneurship and enterprises (PSDRP, 2013). 
Reforms carried out include: 
 Setting up a One Stop Shop (OSS) for business registration; 
 Tax reforms; 
 Reduction in number of licenses through streamlining and elimination. So far 113 out of an 
identified target number of 170 business licences labelled as “unnecessary” have been 
eliminated. 
(PSDRP, 2013) (Private Sector Development Reform Programme (PSDRP), 2013) 
The focus for 2013 includes: 
 developing alternative sources of finance for SMEs;  
 a review of key legislation (e.g. the Companies Act);  
 reform of key border agencies with a view to reducing processes procedures;  
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 introduction of e-registry for business licences 
(PSDRP, 2013) 
Within the region it appears that the PSDRP has received praise for its work on reforming the 
business environment with a recent delegation from Uganda visiting Zambia on a study-tour to 
learn from Zambia’s successful implementation of reforms and citing Zambia as being: “..one of 
the top business reformers in Africa” (Private Sector Development Reform Programme (PSDRP), 
2013). 
11.2.9 sub-conclusions 
As discussed in section 11.2.4 of this paper, the current government has proposed a number of 
major changes that will effect the incentives currently enjoyed by enterprises investing in the 
MFEZ (for example, changes in conditions for: exemption from customs duty; tax incentives; and 
standard rating goods and services). Such changes are aimed at bringing more revenue to the 
Zambian government, improving linkages within the industry, and increasing employment 
opportunities for Zambians. Further proposals such as reducing the USD 50,000 investment 
threshold for SMEs,  aim at making it easier for local SMEs to set up within the zone. According to 
the  ZCCZ general manager, Zan Baosen, the aim for the future of the MFEZ is to diversity and 
encourage enterprises that can add value to the copper being produced:  
“We want to build a whole industrial chain from exploration, concentrating and 
smelting to manufacture copper end products, we want to support mining activities in 
Kitwe and Chingola. We want to add value to copper as much as we can to enhance 
Zambia’s industrial base and create employment for Zambians,” (UK Zambians, 2011)  
As a concrete example of this approach, in February 2012, REBA Industrial Corporation 
Limited established an engineering plant at the Chambishi MFEZ. The plant specialises in 
equipment assembly as well as maintenance and repair of mining equipment (UK Zambians, 
2012) and has also signed an agreement with the Northern Technical College to provide 
students in the engineering department with training on equipment assembly and servicing 
(Ibid.) 
It remains to be seen if and when the new measures proposed by the Zambian government for the 
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MFEZs (outlined above) what effects they will have on investment – whether the MFEZ can 
continue to attract investment under the new terms or whether investors will look elsewhere. It is 
encouraging that there appears to be consensus (at least on paper) between the Zambian 
Government and the management of the ZCCZ about the need to diversify, increase value adding 
activities and encourage local participation in the MFEZ. It can also be viewed that while on the 
one hand some of the monetary incentives are being reduced, there are many other advantages 
that will attract investors – e.g. improvements to the transport infrastructure; Improving the 
investment climate by making it easier to do business in general; and focusing on training and 
developing capacity of Zambians to provide a skilled workforce). At present, it appears that 
Chinese investment in the MFEZ is very much on the increase with more companies signing up in 
early 2013 to invest in the zone: 
During Sata’s state visit, China Non-Ferrous Metals Mining Company signed a $110 mn. 
deal with a group of twelve companies for various businesses which will be located in 
the Multi-Facility Economic Zone, which CNMC is currently developing on the 
Copperbelt (Africa-Asia Confidential, 2013). 
11.3 The Chambishi Copper Smelter 
The Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS) is a joint venture between CNMC (holding 60%) and the 
Yunnan Copper Industry Group (40%).  It has a designed annual capacity of 150 thousand tons of 
blister copper as well as its associated by-product sulphuric acid and, according to CNMC (CNMC 
web page, n.d.) bears a total investment exceeding 310 million USD. The smelter started 
construction in Nov. 2006 and commenced production by the end of 2008. According to CNMC 
(Ibid.) the smelter will further improve the industrial chain of the Chambishi Copper Mine, create 
nearly 1000 jobs and increase the local export volume by 450 million USD. CNMC’s investment in 
Zambia has allegedly exceeded US$ 400 million (CNMC web page, n.d.) 
In April 2012 CCS announced that, as a response to rising demand, it would be expanding its 
operations and increasing its investment in order to double its annual production of blister copper 
to about 300, 000 tonnes with a corresponding sulphuric acid production of 340,000 tonnes. It was 
further announced that CCS has created approximately 1,000 jobs for Zambians in direct 
employment at the smelter as well as around 300 indirect jobs (DKL Engineering Inc, 2012).  In 
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addition to increasing production at the smelter, the extra investment of nearly USD 2 billion will 
also be used for infrastructure development and social benefits such as a 3,000 unit housing 
complex for local workers (Matambo, 2011). 
Copper ore is sourced both from mines within Zambia (i.e. the Chambishi Copper Mine and the 
Lumwana Copper Mines) (Shanghai Metals Market, 2011) as well as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) (WOMP, 2012). The blister copper produced by the smelter is sold to China, India, 
South Korea and European countries while the sulphuric acid is sold to companies within Zambia 
and the DRC (DKL Engineering Inc, 2012). 
11.3.1 Impacts at the Chambishi Copper Smelter of governmental changes in rhetoric and 
policy under the relatively new presidency of Michal Sata 
It is interesting to look at if and how the change in rhetoric and policies of the PF government have 
or will effect operations at the CCS, an enterprise that has previously been the focus of negative 
criticism regarding its mode of operation, especially regarding working conditions.    
11.3.1.1 Wages 
Following Michael Sata’s election in September 2011 miners at the CCS went on strike in early 
October 2011 with demands that their pay be increased to match that offered by other smelters in 
the country (Shanghai Metals Market, 2011). However, talks with the Ministry of Labour, the 
National Union of Miners and Allied Workers, and management at the smelter were entered into 
swiftly and workers returned to work while pay negotiations were carried out (Shanghai Metals 
Market, 2011). Here it is possible, to some extent, to see talk being translated into action in a 
balanced way with the government being willing to intervene and ensure that both the miners 
were listened to while the smelter could continue operating.  
This can be compared with an earlier strike in March 2011 at the CCS when more than 500 
workers went on strike over poor wages and conditions of service. In this instance the then 
Minister of Mines, Mr Maxwell Mwale, considered the miners’ demands to be unfair stating that 
the company was still in its early stages and therefore could not be compared to other, more 
established mining companies. (ZZCM-IH, 2011). In this instance it seems as though miners were 
offered very little government support or sympathy for their situation, with the focus being more 
on the well-being and profitability of the smelter and not for the workers. 
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It is reported that the Chambishi Copper Smelter (CCS) gave an unprecedented pay rise shortly 
after Michael Sata’s successful election as President of Zambia (Mutale, 2013). This pay rise has 
been highlighted by a PF parliamentarian, Joseph Katema, as being a sign of improvements in 
working conditions that mine workers can expect under the PF’s government (Mutale, 2013). It 
should be noted, however, that this claim of a pay rise is not well substantiated and it has not 
been possible to obtain any official up-to-date information regarding salaries for workers at the 
CCS.  The most recent figures are those presented in the 2011 HRW report “You’ll be fired if you 
refuse” (Wells, 2011b) and are as follows: 
Lowest group monthly salary range: USD 117 (approx. ZMK 600,000) 
Middle group monthly salary range: USD 141 – 154 (approx. ZMK 740,000 – 800,450) 
Highest group monthly salary range: USD 261 – 340 (approx. ZMK 1.4 million – 1.8 million) 
Half of the employees fall under the “middle group monthly salary range” 
What can be said is that salary issues are very much in focus in Zambia at the moment and 
following the recent minimum wage increases for non-unionised domestic workers, general 
workers and shop workers as outlined in section 11.2.1, it might be expected, considering the long 
history of wage disputes and resultant strikes in the mining industry,  that similar moves will be 
forthcoming in the copper mining industry. 
11.3.1.2 Health and Safety 
In the 2011 report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) “You’ll be fired if you refuse” (Wells, 2011b) a 
number of health and safety issues were highlighted as being of concern. These include: 
 Insufficient Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) due to non-replacement of worn or 
damaged gear before it has been in use for a specified period of time; 
 Poor ventilation; 
 Pressure on employees to work in unsafe areas. 
Health and safety related problems are considered to have been exacerbated by a lack of 
inspections and enforcement by the Zambian Mines Safety Department. As discussed in section 
11.2.2 there have been positive steps (increased budget support, ability to hire inspectors) taken 
towards improving the capacity of the Mines Safety Department to properly monitor and enforce 
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safety laws. However, it is too soon to be able to comment on the “on-the-ground” impacts of this. 
Nonetheless, there are also signs of improvements from the Chinese side as according to a follow-
up report (Human Rights Watch, 2013) to the 2011 HRW report, CNMC has indicated that it is 
“...open to suggestions concerning the replacement of the damaged PPE” (Human Rights Watch, 
2013).  
In addition to the above identified health and safety concerns, the 2011 HRW report (Wells, 
2011b) found that two CNMC subsidiaries (Sino Metals and CCS) were operating with 12-hour 
shifts instead 8-hour shifts which are more usual for workers in hazardous conditions. In the 2013 
update (Human Rights Watch, 2013) it was noted that workers at Sino Metals started working 8-
hour shifts in early 2012. This shows a big improvement in terms of health and safety as well as 
potentially the well-being of workers. Although at the point of publication the CCS was still 
operating with 12-hour shifts, in light of the increased attention and focus on health and safety 
issues by the Zambian Government (discussed above) it might be reasonably hoped that a similar 
change will also occur here.   
11.3.1.3 Enforcement of environmental legislation 
In February 2013, the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA) closed the CCS for 
breaching Section 105 (1) of the Environmental Management Agency (EMA) Act no 12 of 2011 
following complaints from local farmers in Kalululshi District that sulphur dioxide emissions were 
damaging their crops (Zambia Daily Mail, 2013). According to ZEMA, CCS re-opened again in March 
2013 after it implemented measures to reduce the level of sulphur dioxide emissions. 
Furthermore, ZEMA stated that the CCS will be monitored to ensure that it is complying fully to 
conditions as per the EMA Act and other relevant legislation (Zambia Daily Mail, 2013).  
11.3.1.4 Civil society 
Following the discovery of the high levels of sulphur dioxide emissions, CCS was sued by the group: 
Citizens for Better Environment (CBE) for polluting the local farming community with Sulphur 
Dioxide (Lusaka Times, 2013). In April 2013 the farmers whose crops were destroyed all received 
compensation from CCS with a total amount of ZMK 175 million (approximately USD 330,000) 
being paid out. The Kalushi District Commissioner, Kampamba Mulenga, reported that the farmers 
were satisfied with the amounts received and she held up CCS as a role model for other investors 
for their close cooperation with the Zambian authorities (Kachemba, 2013b). 
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11.3.1.5 Sub-conclusion 
From this section it can be seen that since the PF came to power in 2011 there have already been 
some concrete improvements in conditions at the Chambishi Copper Smelter. It is also worthy to 
note the ability of civil society groups to call large international companies to account. It is 
unfortunate, however, that information was extremely difficult to obtain regarding the CCS. This 
has two effects – firstly it means that this project has had to rely heavily on second hand, possibly 
already outdated data; secondly, it adds weigh to the argument that there is a lack of openess and 
transparency regarding the operations of the CCS. This can only be to the detriment of the Chinese 
investor, CNMC, as it is easier to make assumptions and claims when there is no data to repudiate 
them.  
12 Discussion 
The Role of Chinese Investments – how chinese investments have made Zambia attractive 
As mentioned in the introduction,  the usual consensus on Chinese  investments in African  often 
centres on a discussion on whether it is good or bad for the local economy.  However, this paper’s 
mission is not to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of Chinese investments in Africa. We 
want to acknowledge the fact that, in the case of Zambia, looking at the situation that Zambia’s 
copper industry was in at the time the Chinese came in, it is relevant to say, that Chinese 
investements have helped to revive the then almost dormant copper industry.  Though all the 
credit cannot be given to Chinese activities in the copper industry as there are other FDI’s active in 
this sector. Even so, it would be naive to assume, that if the Chinese had not come to Zambia’s 
copper industry at the time it did, and invested, and revived it then other foreign investors may 
not have found the copper industry to be as attractive. This is especially in light of past events 
when, during the copper crisis, most foreign investors just left when Zambia’s copper industry 
became  a less attractive market for investment. 
 
Partnership with room for meeting Zambia’s agenda 
As Brautigam observed in her field work on Chinese aid, one of the positive things often said about 
the Chinese is that, unlike the West who come to the African countries and first identify “needs” 
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and then provide applicable funding, the Chinese usually leave the task of identifying needs to the 
local government.  This could be read as being partly because of the Chinese “non interferance” 
approach to the politics of their partner countries and partly because the African government can 
be assumed to know more about what the country needs the most. Because of this reason we 
strongly believe that one of the key ways for Zambia to optimise its patnership with the Chinese is 
by having concrete plans.  
A good example of having a concrete plan can be seen with the “Link Zambia 8000” programme 
initiated by President Sata. This programme has its focus on the construction of roads for the 
transportation of goods in and out of, as wel as within, Zambia Infrastructure is of major 
importance with studies showing that there is a positive correlation between infrastructure and 
economic growth. Infrastructure is an particularly needed area of improvement both in the short 
term for copper industry’s development but also for Zambia’s long term development outside of 
the copper industry.  
For Zambia, taking advantage of the chinese presence and making some long and short term plans 
to improve the countries infrastructure will help the country to be able to attract investors to 
invest in other areas of its economy and not just in the special economic zones.  
There are big problems associated with the management and handling of information within and 
between both governments [Zambian and Chinese]. This presents a serious challenge to 
organization and the development and implementation of coherent policies. Even senior officials 
will often rely on the general media which cannot always be relied upon for accuracy and leaves 
considerable room for speculation. (Burke et al, 2007, p. 166) 
 
In addition to having a plan,  here Kragelund agrees with this quote by Burke et al on the issue of 
transparency. The lack of information in this context, especially on the part of the Chinese 
government and, to a degree, on the Zambian5 government presents a problem for making 
coherent policies and implementing a coherent policy to help boost growth in the economy. 
Therefore we suggest that agreements with the Chinese should be treated as public information 
                                                          
5
 This was mostly problematic when the agreements were made in secret between top Zambian elites, such as the 
President and his advisor and even the ministers did not have any factual information as to the exact content of these 
agreements. 
55 
 
especially to policy makers so that they are able to plan and make policies that are in relative to 
(but not dependent on) these agreements. 
Making FOCAC  principles work for both parties – Zambia and China 
Though there is no literature covering the extent to which African nations use the FOCAC 
framework  when dealing with the Chinese, we would like to suggest that besides making local law 
and its enforcement the focus when dealing with Chinese investors, Zambia should also begin to 
make more use of the FOCAC principles. As these principles have already been discussed, two 
examples will be given. For example,  the “mutual benefit“ approach can be used by Zambian 
policy makers as a tool to negotiate better deals with the Chinese. So far, the FOCAC principles 
have mainly been the rhetoric of the Chinese in their dealings with Africa, therefore if these 
principles are being used by the Chinese, the Zambians should see how they can also use the 
mutual benefits principle to their advantage. The point here is that if FOCAC is a framework for 
African-Chinese cooperations then both parties should make more use of its principles whereas as 
the moment it appears as if it’s China who is using them to its advantage. 
Another FOCAC point is the “transfer of technology and know-how” which has been very much 
discussed during the FOCAC summits. Zambia can use this point as an argument for why more 
Zambians should be employed at top executive levels during some big projects so that there can 
be knowledge spillover for Zambians. This is not possible if skilled Zambians are not involved in 
such projects. Under the 2012 FOCAC meeting  one of the items on the agenda was that Chinese 
workers should be paid at same rate as Zambian workers. Again, these are a few examples of how 
Zambian politicians can use what is discussed at the FOCAC meetings as a standard for their 
partnership with China. The point in this is that China claims to only be dealing with the Zambia 
based on these principles, therefore Zambia should do the same. 
 
Acceptance of Sata’s approach 
The new policies put in place under President Sata have not met with criticism from China. There 
can be different reasons as to why this is so: with regards to the Chinese state, resource extraction 
and short term profits are not the only interests but there is also a desire to build a long-term 
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relationship with the African states based on a “win-win” or mutual benefit situation. 
Furthermore, China respects sovereignty and does not attach conditions to their aid, which means 
that China tries to remain invisible in the political affairs of the African countries. In addition, China 
tries to promote independence in regards to Africa’s development. 
In the light of Chinese investments, it could be another matter however. What the PF government 
has done is not to overly tax Chinese investors but instead try to receive the same benefits from 
the extraction industry as other countries do. In 2008 minerals exported out from Zambia were 
only charged with a two percent tax, which made Zambia the country with the lowest mining tax 
compared to the rest of the world. 
With both copper-prices and demand rising, there might be more power for the Zambian 
government to be more active in designing its own policies. This may not have been possible in 
2009 where copper-prices slumped. In 2012 the CCS announced that it would increase investments 
because of higher demand which indicates that investors have no intention of leaving Zambia. 
President Sata has also assured investors that as long as they adhere to Zambian labour laws, they 
are assured good profits from their investments, which, because of the rising prices of copper, he 
may very well have a point in. 
 
Regulation 
Adherence to Zambian law is an important component in Satas new policies, but, as has been 
pointed out by Haglund, the Zambian regulatory environment is characterized by shortfalls in 
institutional capacity. As discussed, the Sata-government has made progress in this area by 
increasing the budget for the Mines Safety Department. In addition, the Sata-government has 
announced measures that will give a better oversight over what minerals are being extracted and 
exported, thereby reducing any loss in revenue due to misreporting. These steps are a move 
towards holding companies responsible, and may also give more transparency. This transparency 
may be used by civil society to contribute to law enforcement. The current PF government has 
made its message about the need for companies to adhere to Zambian labour laws heard across all 
sectors in society. Whether or not this will lead to a more active role for civil society is yet to be 
seen.     
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Growing civil awareness.  
It might be speculated that there has been ever increasing awareness about the lack of benefits 
Zambia receives in terms of revenue from the copper industry as well as the low wages received 
by workers in the copper industry. Furthermore, under President Sata it seems that people are 
listened to and more attention is paid to grievances voiced (e.g. by miners striking over issues of 
pay). This may, in turn, empower civil society groups to confront investors/the government with 
issues that are felt to be in need of addressing. An example of this can be seen with the case 
whereby the Citizens for a Better Environment successfully sued the Chambishi Copper Smelter for 
crop damage caused by sulphur dioxide pollution. Not only is this an indication of confidence to 
bring about the case but it may also set standards for any similar future cases. This can be seen in 
terms of a cycle whereby a stronger civil society can push a government to make changes.  
Provision of a stable investment environment. 
There are a variety of measures that the current Zambian government appears to be putting in 
place in order to encourage and attract investment – both local as well as from overseas:  
It is agreed by many (The World Bank Zambia, 2011) that a stable investment environment is 
required in order to create confidence and attract investors. By moving away from a system 
whereby different investment partners can negotiate individual sets of rules with the government 
(as in the era of Development Agreements) to a system whereby the law is consistent and clear 
with rules that must be abided by all, it could be said that the present Zambian government is 
greatly improving Zambia’s investment environment.  
When this is combined with the additional present focus on improving conditions for SMEs and 
making it easier to do business in Zambia at all levels, the government also appears to be trying to 
improve the potential for linkages within the mining industry. This will also have a positive effect 
on attracting investors. 
In addition, the drive towards improving training and education opportunities may result in a 
better qualified workforce that will both be attractive to investors and boost employment 
prospects for local people.  
Furthermore, the emphasis on improvements in the physical infrastructure of the country allows 
for easier and cheaper movement of goods both within the country as well as between Zambia 
and its neighbouring countries. Another attractive prospect for all investors. 
Although there have been criticisms made of the costs involved to investors (in terms of actual 
costs e.g. wage increases as well as opportunity costs in terms of increased mineral duty) it should 
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also be noted that many of these changes are only bringing Zambia in line with international 
standards of costs (e.g. mineral rates) and accountability (e.g. providing accurate reporting on 
amount of minerals extracted as well as exports out of Zambia). President Sata’s policies and 
ammenments to the law may appear to be radical in light of previous policies but when viewed 
independantly or in a globla context then they appear to be moderate.  
When all of the above factors are taken into consideration it very much appears that Zambia is 
taking back control its resources and setting the agenda so that there truly is much more “mutual 
benefit” within the copper industry both for foreign investors as well as for the country. What 
remains to be seen is the extent to which the current government can maintain the pace of 
reforms as well as provide sufficient monitoring and enforcement to make them effective. Much 
also depends on global demand for copper and subsequent copper prices. With current forecasts 
showing continued demand for at least the next 20 years, it is highly possible that Zambia will be 
able to benefit more from the extraction of its non-renewable resources.  
13 Conclusion 
From this project it can be argued that President Sata’s strategy is based partly on a perceived 
need for Zambia to reap more benefits from its copper industry as well as changes in external 
conditions such as high global copper prices. It appears that there are a number of factors 
contributing to the ability of the current government to push forward its reforms with greater 
confidence and strength than may have been the case had the Patriotic Front and Michael Sata 
come to power at an earlier point in time: 
 
It is arguable that Sata has more policy room now because conditions when the first agreements 
were made between Zambia and Chinese investors in the copper industry were not beneficial to 
Zambia – as noted the Zambia was the country with the lowest mineral tax globally in 2008. As 
copper prices have risen without a corresponding increase in benefits for Zambia, President Sata’s 
policy changes and budget proposals can be seen as a way of trying to get a better deal for Zambia 
and redressing the balance between benefits received by investors and the host country. 
 
As discussed, the DAs that were signed in the 1990s set down conditions that were very much to 
the advantage of the investor and at the expense of benefits received by the Zambian government. 
Although attempts were made to change some of the operating conditions (e.g. changes in 
taxation) investors resisted these changes, referring to the “stability” conditions that exempted 
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them from any alterations to their DA for a fixed period of time (10 – 15 years). It is fortunate for 
President Sata that many of these DAs are now reaching the end of their agreed timeframe and so 
he is in a good position to set a new agenda. 
 
As noted, copper prices have now increased since the slump in 2008. If demand for copper 
remains high over the coming years then this will put the Zambian government in a good 
bargaining position when it comes to setting better working and operating conditions (e.g. higher 
wages; adherence to environmental law, etc) 
 
It should also be noted that China is increasingly interested in Africa and not only for the minerals, 
with Zambia being a preferred location for Chinese investment. This increased interest in Africa 
may have reached a point where the countries, and by that Zambia, think they can demand more 
from Chinese investors due to Chinese needs, both political and economic.   
 
14 A new perspective... 
To get a clearer perspective on the opportunities for Zambia to follow its own policies, it could be 
useful to look at the degree to which Zambia has possibilities to trade with its neighbouring 
countries thereby not having to depend on Chinese (and western) imports as it now does. Zambia’s 
need to import advanced machinery also means that the country has to attract more FDI. A look at 
the possibility to connect with other African countries would further enable one to understand the 
ability of Zambia to follow its own development agenda. 
This connection with other African countries could perhaps open up for a more protectionist trade 
system because of the balance of power would not be in the Chinese or western favour, of course 
one would have to look at the power relations within the African continent, which surely also has 
its own power structures. 
The angle on internal African trade has only been briefly touched within this project, but it was 
mentioned that China might use African countries as a hub, so as to “flood” other African countries 
with Chinese goods via intra-African trade relations, this could be followed more closely within the 
framework of internal African trade. 
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Appendix i: Macroeconomic data 
 
GDP pr capita in Zambia had a record low in December 1999, with 314.4 USD. From there on GDP 
has been rising steadily and reached a GDP of 439.13 in 2012 (Trading Economics, 2013a). 
 
GDP annual growth rate; Zambia had an record low growth in 1994 by -8.63%, but since 1996, 
growth has picked up, and since 1999 to 2011 been between 3.3% to 7.3% with the last being in 
2012 (Trading Economics, 2013b) 
 
Zambia government debt to GDP; From 1990 until 2011, Zambia Government Debt to GDP 
averaged 122.9 percent reaching an all time high of 277.5 percent in December of 1991 and a 
record low of 4.4 percent in December of 2006. Since 2010, debt has fallen from 50 percent to GDP 
to 31.2 percent in 2012 (Trading Economics, 2013c) 
 
Stock of private sector external debt to China; Private sector external debt to China have been 
rising   since 2010 where debt was at 785.2 mio. USD, and has since then been steadily rising to 
1106.3 mio. USD in 2012. This can be compared to the overall debt which has been more or less 
stagnant, from 4809.6 mio. USD in 2010 to 4881.9 mio. USD in 2012 (Bank of Zambia, 2012)   
 
Zambia balance of trade; In 2012 Zambia had a trade surplus of 20.50 million USD. From 2005 to 
2012 Zambias balance of trade averaged 88.4 million USD, with an all time high of 297.9 million 
USD in 2010, and a record low of -129.1 million USD in 2007 (Trading Economics, 2013d) 
 
Zambia inflation Rate; In March 2013, inflation rate in Zambia stood at 6.6 percent. From 2005 to 
2013 inflation rate averaged 9.84 percent, with 19.2 percent in April 2005 (Trading Economics, 
2013e) 
 
Foreign direct investment as % of GDP; in 2006 the FDI of GDP stood at 5.65 percent and increased 
to 11.47 in 2007. From this point it fell to 6.41 percent in 2008 and 5.43 percent in 2009. it almost 
doubled in 2010, to 10.68 percent and was almost halved the next year, where it fell to 5.77 
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percent. In 2012 FDI of GDP stood at 8 percent (Bank of Zambia, 2012) 
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Appendix ii. Graph showing global copper prices in USD/lb from 2008 - 2013 
 
 
 
 
(source: http://www.kitcometals.com/charts/copper_historical_large.html#5years) 
